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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title A quantitative analysis of subsidy competition in the U.S.
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Alessandro Ferrari
  • Ralph Ossa
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Journal of Public Economics
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0047-2727
Volume 224
Page Range 104919
Date 2023
Abstract Text We use a quantitative economic geography model to explore subsidy competition among U.S. states. We ask what motivates state governments to subsidize firm relocations and quantify how strong their incentives are. We also characterize fully non-cooperative and cooperative subsidy choices and assess how far away we are from these extremes. We find that states have strong incentives to subsidize firm relocations in order to gain at the expense of other states. We also find that observed subsidies are closer to cooperative than non-cooperative subsidies but the potential losses from an escalation of subsidy competition are large.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104919
Other Identification Number merlin-id:23958
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Keywords Economics and econometrics, finance
Additional Information Bereits als Working Paper in NBER Working Paper Series No. 20975 erschienen: https://doi.org/10.3386/w20975.