Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Optimal contest design: tuning the heat |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
|
| Journal Title | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0022-0531 |
| Volume | 213 |
| Page Range | 105616 |
| Date | 2023 |
| Abstract Text | We consider the design of contests when the principal can choose both the prize profile and how the prizes are allocated as a function of a possibly noisy signal about the agents' efforts. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee optimality of a contest. Optimal contests have a minimally competitive prize profile and an intermediate degree of competitiveness in the contest success function. Whenever observation is not too noisy, the optimum can be achieved by an all-pay contest with a cap. When observation is perfect, the optimum can also be achieved by a nested Tullock contest. We relate our results to a recent literature which has asked similar questions but has typically focused on the design of either the prize profile or the contest success function. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105616 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:23813 |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|
| Keywords | Economics and econometrics, contest design, optimal contests, tournaments |