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Contribution Details

Type Conference or Workshop Paper
Scope Learning and pedagogical Research
Published in Proceedings Yes
Title Bayesian Optimization-based Combinatorial Assignment
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Jakob Weissteiner
  • Jakob Heiss
  • Julien Siems
  • Sven Seuken
Presentation Type paper
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
ISSN 2159-5399
Page Range 5858 - 5866
Event Title 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'23)
Event Type conference
Event Location Washington D.C., United States of America
Event Start Date February 7 - 2023
Event End Date February 14 - 2023
Series Name Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Number 37/5
Publisher AAAI Press
Abstract Text We study the combinatorial assignment domain, which includes combinatorial auctions and course allocation. The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, several papers have recently proposed machine learning-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most important information from agents. However, the main shortcoming of this prior work is that it does not model a mechanism's uncertainty over values for not yet elicited bundles. In this paper, we address this shortcoming by presenting a Bayesian optimization-based combinatorial assignment (BOCA) mechanism. Our key technical contribution is to integrate a method for capturing model uncertainty into an iterative combinatorial auction mechanism. Concretely, we design a new method for estimating an upper uncertainty bound that can be used to define an acquisition function to determine the next query to the agents. This enables the mechanism to properly explore (and not just exploit) the bundle space during its preference elicitation phase. We run computational experiments in several spectrum auction domains to evaluate BOCA's performance. Our results show that BOCA achieves higher allocative efficiency than state-of-the-art approaches.
Free access at DOI
Official URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.14698
Related URLs
Digital Object Identifier 10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25726
Other Identification Number merlin-id:23345
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Additional Information Section: AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms