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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Killer incentives: rivalry, performance and risk-taking among German fighter pilots, 1939-45
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Philipp Ager
  • Leonardo Bursztyn
  • Lukas Leucht
  • Hans-Joachim Voth
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Review of Economic Studies
Publisher Oxford University Press
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0034-6527
Volume 89
Number 5
Page Range 2257 - 2292
Date 2022
Abstract Text Using newly collected data on death rates and aerial victories of more than 5,000 German fighter pilots during World War II, we examine the effects of public recognition on performance and risk-taking. When a particular pilot is honoured publicly, both the victory rate and the death rate of his former peers increase. Fellow pilots react more if they come from the same region of Germany, or if they worked closely with him. Our results suggest that personal rivalry can be a prime motivating force, and that non-financial rewards can lead to a crowd-in of both effort and risk-taking via social connections.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1093/restud/rdab085
Other Identification Number merlin-id:23267
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Keywords Economics and econometrics, non-financial rewards, rivalry, status competition, World War II