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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title The Effect of the Initial Distribution of Labor-Related Property Rights on the Allocative Efficiency of Labor Markets
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Helmut Max Dietl
  • Markus Lang
  • Johannes Orlowski
  • Philipp Wegelin
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name UZH Business Working Paper Series
Number 398
ISSN 2296-0422
Number of Pages 37
Date 2023
Abstract Text We conduct an empirical study to examine the impact of the initial distribution of labor-related property rights on the allocative efficiency of labor markets for skilled workers in a highly competitive labor market (professional basketball). Specifically, we compare a regime where employers can trade workers to other employers without the worker's consent to one where workers have the right to negotiate freely with other employers and move without their employer's consent. Our results indicate that contrary to the predictions of the Coase Theorem, allocative efficiency decreases when workers have the initial right to negotiate freely and move to another employer.
Free access at Official URL
Official URL https://www.business.uzh.ch/de/research/wps.html
Digital Object Identifier 10.2139/ssrn.4331578
Other Identification Number merlin-id:23253
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Keywords Coase theorem, labor market, allocative efficiency, productivity, sports as a lab