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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Earnings management and managerial honesty: the investors’ perspectives
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Rajna Gibson
  • Matthias Sohn
  • Carmen Tanner
  • Alexander Wagner
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper
Number 17-03
ISSN 1556-5068
Date 2022
Abstract Text This paper studies how investors infer CEO commitment to honesty from earnings management and how these perceptions – in conjunction with investors’ own social and moral preferences – shape their investment choices. We conduct two laboratory experiments simulating investment choices. Our results show that participants perceive a CEO to be more committed to honesty when they infer that the CEO engaged less in earnings management. For investment decisions, a one standard deviation increase in a CEO's perceived commitment to honesty compared to another CEO reduces the relevance of differences in the CEOs’ claimed future returns by 40%. This effect is most prominent among investors with a proself value orientation. To prosocial investors, their own honesty values and those attributed to the CEO matter directly, while returns only play a secondary role. Overall, our results suggest that moral motives are not a niche concern for norm-constrained investors, but instead matter to different categories of investors for distinct reasons.
Digital Object Identifier 10.2139/ssrn.2912795
Other Identification Number merlin-id:23159
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Additional Information forthcoming in "European Accounting Review"