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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
Organization Unit
  • Marek Pycia
  • M Utku Ünver
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
  • English
Journal Title Review of Economic Design
Publisher Springer
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 1434-4742
Volume 26
Number 4
Page Range 581 - 604
Date 2022
Abstract Text Serial dictatorships have emerged as the canonical simple mechanisms in the literature on the allocation of indivisible goods without transfers. They are the only neutral and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in environments in which agents have no outside options and hence no individual rationality constraints (Svensson in Soc Choice Welfare 16:557–567, 1999). Accounting for outside options and individual rationality constraints, our main result constructs the class of group-strategy-proof, neutral, and non-wasteful mechanisms. These mechanisms are also Pareto efficient and we call them binary serial dictatorships. The abundance of the outside option - anybody who wants can opt out to get it - is crucial for our result.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1007/s10058-022-00321-7
Other Identification Number merlin-id:23133
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Keywords General economics, econometrics and finance, house allocation, neutrality, strategy-proofness, outside options, individual rationality, serial dictatorship