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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Review of Economic Design |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 1434-4742 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Number | 4 |
| Page Range | 581 - 604 |
| Date | 2022 |
| Abstract Text | Serial dictatorships have emerged as the canonical simple mechanisms in the literature on the allocation of indivisible goods without transfers. They are the only neutral and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in environments in which agents have no outside options and hence no individual rationality constraints (Svensson in Soc Choice Welfare 16:557–567, 1999). Accounting for outside options and individual rationality constraints, our main result constructs the class of group-strategy-proof, neutral, and non-wasteful mechanisms. These mechanisms are also Pareto efficient and we call them binary serial dictatorships. The abundance of the outside option - anybody who wants can opt out to get it - is crucial for our result. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1007/s10058-022-00321-7 |
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| Keywords | General economics, econometrics and finance, house allocation, neutrality, strategy-proofness, outside options, individual rationality, serial dictatorship |