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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | CEO Turnover and Director Reputation |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | University of St.Gallen - School of Finance Research Paper |
| Number | 2021/06 |
| Number of Pages | 85 |
| Date | 2022 |
| Abstract Text | This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. Directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Reputational losses are larger for turnovers with a higher potential for disrupting a firm's management, for directors favorably inclined to the CEO, and for directors with a committee-based responsibility for monitoring the CEO. Our results imply that the average forced CEO turnover signals a governance failure at the board level, and that shareholders rely on salient actions to update their beliefs about directors' hidden qualities. |
| Free access at | DOI |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.2139/ssrn.3774434 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:22685 |
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