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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Preferences, confusion and competition
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Andreas Hefti
  • Shuo Liu
  • Armin Schmutzler
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Economic Journal
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0013-0133
Volume 132
Number 645
Page Range 1852 - 1881
Date 2022
Abstract Text Existing literature has argued that firms benefit from confusing consumers of homogeneous goods. This paper shows that this insight generally breaks down with differentiated goods and heterogeneous preferences: with polarised taste distributions, firms fully educate consumers. In cases where firms nevertheless confuse consumers, the welfare consequences are worse than for homogeneous goods, as consumers choose dominated options. Similar insights are also obtained for political contests, in which candidates compete for voters with heterogeneous preferences: parties choose ambiguous platforms only when preferences are ‘indecisive’, featuring a concentration of indifferent voters.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1093/ej/ueac009
Other Identification Number merlin-id:22501
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Keywords Economics and econometrics
Additional Information Earlier published as ECON Working Paper No. 344: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/187397/