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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | A game-theoretic implication of the Riemann hypothesis |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 410 |
| ISSN | 1664-7041 |
| Number of Pages | 23 |
| Date | 2023 |
| Abstract Text | The Riemann Hypothesis (RH) is one of the major unsolved problems in pure mathematics. In this note, a parameterized family of non-cooperative games is constructed with the property that, if RH holds true, then any game in this family admits a unique Nash equilibrium. We argue that this result is not degenerate. Indeed, neither is the conclusion a tautology, nor is RH used to define the family of games. |
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| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:22320 |
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| Keywords | Riemann hypothesis, Nash equilibrium |
| Additional Information | Revised version |