Not logged in.

Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title On market prices in double auctions
Organization Unit
  • Simon Jantschgi
  • Heinrich H Nax
  • Bary S R Pradelski
  • Marek Pycia
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 404
ISSN 1664-7041
Number of Pages 14
Date 2022
Abstract Text We address some open issues regarding the characterization of double auctions. Our model is a two-sided commodity market with either finitely or infinitely many traders. We first unify existing formulations for both finite and infinite markets and generalize the characterization of market clearing in the presence of ties. Second, we define a mechanism that achieves market clearing in any, finite or infinite, market instance and show that it coincides with the k-double auction by Rustichini et al. (1994) in the former case. In particular, it clarifies the consequences of ties in submissions and makes common regularity assumptions obsolete. Finally, we show that the resulting generalized mechanism implements Walrasian competitive equilibrium.
Related URLs
Other Identification Number merlin-id:22226
PDF File Download from ZORA
Export BibTeX
Keywords Double auction, Walrasian equilibrium, finite and infinite markets, axiomatization