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Contribution Details
| Type | Book Chapter |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Equilibrium Investor Protection: Active Mutual Fund Fees |
| Organization Unit | |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Booktitle | Cambridge Handbook of Investor Protection |
| ISBN | 9781108987622 |
| Place of Publication | Cambridge, UK |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Page Range | 241 - 258 |
| Date | 2022 |
| Abstract Text | The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 charged the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with regulating financial markets as “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”1 Many came to believe this language gave the SEC too little guidance and too much discretion. In 1996, Congress directed the SEC to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether a proposed rule will promote “efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”2 As the SEC interpreted these words beginning in 2012, the Act requires it to incorporate economic analysis into the rulemaking process. Absent a clear statutory mandate to impose a specific rule, the analysis must justify the rule by identifying a market failure as well as the rule’s likely effect on market outcomes.3 |
| Free access at | Official URL |
| Official URL | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108987622.017 |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1017/9781108987622.017 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:21843 |
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