Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
|
| Journal Title | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0022-0531 |
| Volume | 196 |
| Number | 105303 |
| Page Range | 105303 |
| Date | 2021 |
| Abstract Text | We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design. |
| Related URLs | |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105303 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:21265 |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|
| Keywords | Random assignment, pseudomarkets, welfare theorems, Walrasian equilibrium, discrete markets, multi-unit demand, single-unit demand, complementarities, constraints |