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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Matching with externalities |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 392 |
| ISSN | 1664-705X |
| Number of Pages | 50 |
| Date | 2021 |
| Abstract Text | We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply. |
| Related URLs | |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.2139/ssrn.3872676 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:21152 |
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| Keywords | Matching, externalities, two-sided matching, matching with contracts, stable matching, labor markets, deferred acceptance, substitutes |
| Additional Information | Ebenfalls erschienen bei SSRN (https://www.zora.uzh.ch/152254) sowie bei Review of Economic Studies als No. 392 (https://www.zora.uzh.ch/230229). |