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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Optimal contest design: a general approach |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | Department of Economics, University of Bern |
| Series Name | Discussion Papers |
| Number | 20-11 |
| Number of Pages | 44 |
| Date | 2020 |
| Abstract Text | We consider the design of contests for n agents when the principal can choose both the prize profile and the contest success function. Our framework includes Tullock contests, Lazear-Rosen tournaments and all-pay contests as special cases, among others. We show that the optimal contest has an intermediate degree of competitiveness in the contest success function, and a minimally competitive prize profile with n−1 identical prizes. The optimum can be achieved with a nested Tullock contest. We extend the model to allow for imperfect performance measurement and for heterogeneous agents. We relate our results to a recent literature which has asked similar questions but has typically focused on the design of either the prize profile or the contest success function. |
| Official URL | https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/150266 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:20776 |
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| Keywords | Contest design, optimal contests, tournaments |