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Contribution Details

Type Scientific Publication In Electronic Form
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Supranational rules, national discretion: Increasing versus inflating regulatory bank capital
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Reint Gropp
  • Thomas Mosk
  • Steven Ongena
  • Ines Simac
  • Carlo Wix
Language
  • English
Place of Publication London
Publisher VoxEU, CEPR Policy Portal
Date 2021
Abstract Text The implementation of supranational regulations at the national level often provides national authorities with substantial room to engage in discretion and forbearance. Using evidence from a supranational increase in bank capital requirements, this column shows that national authorities may assist banks' efforts to inflate their regulatory capital to pass such supranational requirements. While supranational rules should be binding in theory, national discretion may effectively undermine them in practice.
Free access at Official URL
Official URL https://voxeu.org/article/supranational-rules-national-discretion-and-regulatory-bank-capital
Other Identification Number merlin-id:20759
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