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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Investment and market dominance |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | RAND Journal of Economics |
| Publisher | Wiley Open Access |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0741-6261 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Number | 1 |
| Page Range | 1 - 26 |
| Date | 2001 |
| Abstract Text | We analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment. Special cases include incremental investment, patent races, learning by doing, and network externalities. We investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments. To this end, we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes, which applies to our investment game. Finally, we highlight plausible countervailing effects that arise when investments of leaders are less effective than those of laggards, or in dynamic games when firms are sufficiently patient. |
| Free access at | Related URL |
| Related URLs | |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.2307/2696395 |
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