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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Environmental regulations and managerial myopia |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Environmental and Resource Economics |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0924-6460 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Number | 1 |
| Page Range | 87 - 100 |
| Date | 2001 |
| Abstract Text | It has recently been claimed that, contrary to traditional neoclassical theory, suitably chosen environmental regulation is often beneficial for the regulated firms because it induces cost-reducing innovations. I analyze the extent to which this position is compatible with microeconomic analysis. It turns out that even in a framework in which organizational inefficiencies might lead to underinvestment, environmental policy can only increase firm profits if several very specific conditions are met. These conditions concern the type of policy, the extent of inefficiencies, the costs of potential innovation projects and their effect on productivity and abatement costs. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1023/A:1011113106055 |
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| Additional Information | The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com. |