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| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| Volume | 191 |
| Page Range | 1 - 33 |
| Date | 2021 |
| Abstract Text | We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for “how strategyproof” an assignment mechanism is. We apply this new concept to derive novel insights about the incentive properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism and different variants of the Boston mechanism. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105144 |
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