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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0022-0531 |
| Volume | 107 |
| Number | 2 |
| Page Range | 474 - 482 |
| Date | 2002 |
| Abstract Text | We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n−1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies— regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1006/jeth.2001.2958 |
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