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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Backward induction and the game-theoretic analysis of chess
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Christian Ewerhart
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0899-8256
Volume 39
Number 2
Page Range 206 - 214
Date 2002
Abstract Text The paper scrutinizes various stylized facts related to the minmax theorem for chess. We first point out that, in contrast to the prevalent understanding, chess is actually an infinite game, so that backward induction does not apply in the strict sense. Second, we recall the original argument for the minmax theorem of chess – which is forward rather than backward looking. Then it is shown that, alternatively, the minmax theorem for the infinite version of chess can be reduced to the minmax theorem of the usually employed finite version. The paper concludes with a comment on Zermelo’s (1913) non-repetition theorem.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1006/game.2001.0900
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