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| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Finite blockchain games |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Economics Letters |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0165-1765 |
| Volume | 197 |
| Number | 109614 |
| Page Range | 109614 |
| Date | 2020 |
| Abstract Text | This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. Moreover, miners are rewarded for blocks that eventually become part of the longest chain. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109614 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:19911 |
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| Keywords | Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Blockchain, Proof-of-work, Nash equilibrium, Subgame perfection, Selfish mining |
| Additional Information | Also published as Working Paper No. 355, Department of Economics, University of Zurich, see https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-188648. |