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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Finite blockchain games
Organization Unit
  • Christian Ewerhart
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
  • English
Journal Title Economics Letters
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0165-1765
Volume 197
Number 109614
Page Range 109614
Date 2020
Abstract Text This paper studies the dynamic construction of a blockchain by competitive miners. In contrast to the literature, we assume a finite time horizon. Moreover, miners are rewarded for blocks that eventually become part of the longest chain. It is shown that popular mining strategies such as adherence to conservative mining or to the longest-chain rule constitute pure-strategy Nash equilibria. However, these equilibria are not subgame perfect.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109614
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Keywords Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Blockchain, Proof-of-work, Nash equilibrium, Subgame perfection, Selfish mining
Additional Information Also published as Working Paper No. 355, Department of Economics, University of Zurich, see