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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Are Workers Rewarded for Inconsistent Performance?
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Anil Özdemir
  • Helmut Max Dietl
  • Giambattista Rossi
  • Robert Simmons
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name UZH Business Working Paper Series
Number 386
ISSN 2296-0422
Number of Pages 39
Date 2020
Abstract Text This paper examines whether workers are rewarded for inconsistent performances by salary premia. Some earlier research suggests that performance inconsistency leads to salary premia while other research finds premia for consistent performances. Using detailed salary and performance data, we find that inconsistency is rewarded for some dimensions of performance, specifically those where creativity is important and outcomes have higher variance. We find salary penalties for inconsistent performances in those dimensions that are basic requirements of successful team production.
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