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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Multiple behavioral rules in Cournot oligopolies
Organization Unit
  • Carlos Alos-Ferrer
  • Alexander Ritschel
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 331
ISSN 1664-705X
Number of Pages 33
Date 2020
Abstract Text We study intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity in an experimental Cournot oligopoly. Previous empirical results in this setting have demonstrated convergence to competitive outcomes, in agreement with theoretical predictions assuming that players imitate successful opponents. We postulate that players sometimes rely on imitation of successful behavior, and sometimes best reply to the actions of others. Testable predictions are obtained from a model allowing for multiple behavioral rules which accounts for differences in the cognitive nature of the underlying decision processes. Those include non-trivial response time interactions depending on whether the rules share a common prescription (alignment) or not (conflict), a classification which is ex ante observable. The results confirm the hypotheses and support the presence of multiple behavioral rules at the individual level.
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Other Identification Number merlin-id:18366
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Keywords Cournot oligopoly, imitation, best reply, multiple behavioral rules, Verhaltensökonomie, Oligopol, Entscheidungsfindung, Nachahmung
Additional Information Revised version