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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title The impact of government subsidies in professional team sports leagues
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Helmut Max Dietl
  • Markus Lang
  • Cornel Nesseler
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name UZH Business Working Paper Series
Number 366
ISSN 2296-0422
Number of Pages 28
Date 2017
Abstract Text This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of subsidies on player salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and welfare. Within this model, fan demand depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent. The results show that if a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance and own team winning percentage, club rofits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the small-market club is subsidized, a small subsidy increases competitive balance and player salaries of both clubs.
Other Identification Number merlin-id:18184
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