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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Unintended Consequences of Unemployment Insurance Benefits: The Role of Banks
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Gazi Kabas
  • Yavuz Arslan
  • Ahmet Degerli
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name SSRN
Number 3280437
Date 2018
Abstract Text Unemployment insurance (UI) policies are implemented by many countries to lower individual income risk and to automatically stabilize macroeconomic fluctuations. To the extent that these policies are successful, they should be reducing precautionary savings and hence bank deposits - households' major saving instrument. In this paper, we use this lower incentive to save and uncover a novel distortionary mechanism through which UI policies affect the economy. In particular, we show that when state UI benefits become more generous bank deposits decrease. Since deposits are the main and uniquely stable funding source for banks, the decrease in deposits squeezes bank commercial lending, which in turn reduces firm investment. These results imply that UI policies have the potential to destabilize the economy through banking sector by impairing banks' deposit funding - banks' major and stable funding source, which makes banks more exposed to negative shocks during bad times.
Official URL https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3280437
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