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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Alexey Kushnir
  • Shuo Liu
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Economic Theory
Publisher Springer
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0938-2259
Volume 67
Number 3
Page Range 617 - 644
Date 2019
Abstract Text We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation (Manelli and Vincent in Econometrica 78:1905–1938, 2010; Gershkov et al. in Econometrica 81: 197–220, 2013) to environments with nonlinear utilities satisfying a property of increasing differences over distributions and a convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision.
Official URL https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00199-018-1124-x
Digital Object Identifier 10.1007/s00199-018-1124-x
Other Identification Number merlin-id:16372
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Keywords Bayesian implementation, dominant strategy implementation, mechanism design, nonlinear utilities, increasing differences over distributions