Not logged in.

Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Collateral, Central Bank Repos, and Systemic Arbitrage
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Kjell G. Nyborg
  • Falko Fecht
  • Jörg Rocholl
  • Jiri Woschitz
Language
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series
Number 16-66
Number of Pages 58
Date 2016
Abstract Text Central banks are under increased scrutiny because of the rapid growth in, and composition of, their balance sheets. Therefore, understanding the processes that shape these balance sheets and their consequences is crucial. We contribute by studying an extensive dataset of banks’ liquidity uptake and pledged collateral in central bank repos. We document systemic arbitrage whereby banks funnel credit risk and low-quality collateral to the central bank. Weaker banks use lower quality collateral to demand disproportionately larger amounts of central bank money (liquidity). This holds both before and after the financial crisis and may contribute to financial fragility and fragmentation.
Free access at DOI
Digital Object Identifier 10.2139/ssrn.2871337
Other Identification Number merlin-id:15908
PDF File Download from ZORA
Export BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)