Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | On reputation: a microfoundation of contract enforcement and price rigidity |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
|
| Journal Title | Economic Journal |
| Publisher | Wiley-Blackwell |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0013-0133 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Number | 536 |
| Page Range | 333 - 353 |
| Date | 2009 |
| Abstract Text | We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing contract efficiency substantially. This effect is, however, associated with a considerable bilateralisation of market interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price rigidities arising from social preferences. Thus, in markets characterized by moral hazard, reputational incentives unambiguously increase mutually beneficial exchanges, reduce rents, and render markets more responsive to supply and demand shocks. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02240.x |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|
| Additional Information | The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com |