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Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | Economics Letters |
| Publisher | Elsevier |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0165-1765 |
| Volume | 103 |
| Number | 1 |
| Page Range | 33 - 35 |
| Date | 2009 |
| Abstract Text | This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance is offered. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.01.011 |
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