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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title A comparison of different pay-per-bid auction formats
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Ju-Young Kim
  • Tobias Brünner
  • Bernd Skiera
  • Martin Natter
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title International Journal of Research in Marketing
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0167-8116
Volume 31
Number 4
Page Range 368 - 379
Date 2014
Abstract Text Pay-per-bid auctions are a popular new type of Internet auction that is unique because a fee is charged for each bid that is placed. This paper uses a theoretical model and three large empirical data sets with 44,614 ascending and 1,460 descending pay-per-bid auctions to compare the economic effects of different pay-per-bid auction formats, such as different price increments and ascending versus descending auctions. The theoretical model suggests revenue equivalence between different price increments and descending and ascending auctions. The empirical results, however, refute the theoretical predictions: ascending auctions with smaller price increments yield, on average, higher revenues per auction than ascending auctions with higher price increments, but their revenues vary much more strongly. On average, ascending auctions yield higher revenues per auction than descending auctions, but results differ strongly across product categories. Additionally, revenues per ascending auction also vary much more strongly.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.ijresmar.2014.04.003
Other Identification Number merlin-id:14182
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