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| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of evolution in games |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
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| Journal Title | International Game Theory Review |
| Publisher | World Scientific Publishing |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0219-1989 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Number | 2 |
| Page Range | 197 - 204 |
| Date | 2010 |
| Abstract Text | We consider a model of evolution with mutations as in Kandori et al (1993) [Kandori,M., Mailath, G.J., Rob, R., 1993. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61, 29-56], where agents follow best-response decision rules as in Sandholm (1998) [Sandholm, W., 1998. Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution. Economics Letters 61, 165-170]. Contrary to those papers, our model gives rise to a birth-death process, which allows explicit computation of the long-run probabilities of equilibria for given values of the mutation rate and the population size. We use this fact to provide a direct proof of the stochastic stability of riskdominant equilibria as the mutation rate tends to zero, and illustrate the outcomes of the dynamics for positive mutation rates. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1142/S021919891000260X |
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