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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Designing dynamic research contests
Organization Unit
  • Jean-Michel Benkert
  • Igor Letina
  • English
Institution University of Zurich
Series Name Working paper series / Department of Economics
Number 235
ISSN 1664-7041
Number of Pages 36
Date 2019
Abstract Text This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best.
Other Identification Number merlin-id:13902
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Keywords Innovation, dynamic contests, research contests, inducement prizes, Innovation, Stoppregel, Forschung, Implementation, Dynamisches Entscheidungsmodell, Innovation, Belohnung
Additional Information Revised version