Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
Type | Working Paper |
Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
Title | Designing dynamic research contests |
Organization Unit | |
Authors |
|
Language |
|
Institution | University of Zurich |
Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
Number | 235 |
ISSN | 1664-7041 |
Number of Pages | 36 |
Date | 2019 |
Abstract Text | This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where: (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best. |
Other Identification Number | merlin-id:13902 |
PDF File | Download from ZORA |
Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA) |
Keywords | Innovation, dynamic contests, research contests, inducement prizes, Innovation, Stoppregel, Forschung, Implementation, Dynamisches Entscheidungsmodell, Innovation, Belohnung |
Additional Information | Revised version |