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Contribution Details

Type Journal Article
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title The shadow costs of repos and bank liability structure
Organization Unit
Authors
  • Nataliya Klimenko
  • Santiago Moreno-Bromberg
Item Subtype Original Work
Refereed Yes
Status Published in final form
Language
  • English
Journal Title Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Publisher Elsevier
Geographical Reach international
ISSN 0165-1889
Volume 65
Page Range 1 - 29
Date 2016
Abstract Text Making use of a structural model that allows for optimal liquidity management, we study the role that repos play in a bank׳s financing structure. In our model the bank׳s assets consist of illiquid loans and liquid reserves and are financed by a combination of repos, long-term debt, deposits and equity. Repos are a cheap source of funding, but they are subject to an exogenous rollover risk. We show that the use of repos inflicts two types of indirect (“shadow”) costs on the bank׳s shareholders: first, it induces the bank to maintain higher liquid reserves in order to alleviate the additional default risk; second, it adds to the cost of long-term debt financing. These shadow costs limit the bank׳s appetite for cheap but unstable repo funding. This effect is, however, weakened under poor returns on risky assets, access to deposit funding and the depositor preference rule. We also analyze the impact of a liquidity coverage ratio, payout restrictions and a leverage ratio on the bank׳s financing choices and show that all these tools are able to curb the bank׳s reliance on repos.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1016/j.jedc.2016.01.004
Other Identification Number merlin-id:13296
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Keywords Economics and Econometrics, Control and Optimization, Applied Mathematics