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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Inducing variety: a theory of innovation contests |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | Working paper series / Department of Economics |
| Number | 200 |
| ISSN | 1664-7041 |
| Number of Pages | 49 |
| Date | 2019 |
| Abstract Text | This paper analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research approach, but the best approach is unknown. Inducing a variety of research approaches generates an option value. We show that suitable contests can induce such variety. The buyer-optimal contest is a bonus tournament, where suppliers can choose only between a low bid and a high bid. This contest implements the socially optimal variety for a suitable parameter range. Finally, we compare the optimal contest to scoring auctions and fixed-prize tournaments. |
| Official URL | http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/workingpapers.php?id=879 |
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| Keywords | Contests, tournaments, auctions, diversity, innovation, procurement, Innovation, Turnier |
| Additional Information | Revised version ; former titles: "Designing institutions for diversity" (July 2015), and "Designing Innovation Contests for Diversity" (Dec. 2015) |