Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Journal Article |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | On the asymptotic convergence to mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Item Subtype | Original Work |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Status | Published in final form |
| Language |
|
| Journal Title | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Geographical Reach | international |
| ISSN | 0020-7276 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Number | 4 |
| Page Range | 549 - 559 |
| Date | 1997 |
| Abstract Text | We analyse the stability properties of mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games under evolutionary dynamics. With the standard replicator dynamics these equilibria are stable but not asymptotically stable. We modified the replicator dynamics by introducing players of two types: myopies — like in the standard replicator dynamics — and best responders. The behaviour of the latter is described by a continuos time version of the best reply dynamics. Asymptotic convergence under theModified Replicator Dynamics is proved by identifying a strictly decreasing Ljapunov function. We argue that the finding has important implications to justify the use of economic models with mixed strategy equilibria. |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.1007/BF01813890 |
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|
| Keywords | Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behavior, Sciences, Economic Theory, Operation Research/Decision Theory, Organization/Planning |