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| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Corporate lobbying and firm performance |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
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| Language |
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| Institution | University of Zurich |
| Series Name | SSRN |
| Number | 1014264 |
| ISSN | 1556-5068 |
| Number of Pages | 42 |
| Date | 2014 |
| Abstract Text | Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators, and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action Committees (PAC), and unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation. |
| Free access at | Official URL |
| Official URL | http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014264 |
| Digital Object Identifier | 10.2139/ssrn.1014264 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:11802 |
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| Additional Information | Forthcoming, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting |