Contributions in Merlin

Firms often discourage certain categories of individuals from buying their products, seemingly at odds with typical assumptions about profit maximization. This paper provides a potential rationale for such firm behavior: Consumers seek to signal that they have “desirable” ideological values to themselves and others by avoiding products popular among people with “undesirable” values. In laboratory experiments and surveys, I provide causal evidence that consumption can be diagnostic of consumers’ ideologies and that demand for a product is lower if its customer base consists of individuals whose ideological values are widely considered undesirable. These effects occur for both observable and unobservable consumption and for products that do not possess any inherent ideological or undesirable qualities.

We examine how deep agreements on domestic regulations affect welfare in a world where such agreements are influenced by producer lobbies. The answer to this question depends in a critical way on whether the agreement focuses on product standards or on production regulations. International cooperation on product standards can decrease welfare, and this is more likely to happen when producer lobbies are stronger. On the other hand, international cooperation on production regulations tends to enhance welfare when lobbying pressures are strong. A key determinant of the welfare impact of deep agreements is whether the interests of producer lobbies in different countries are aligned or in conflict: the former situation tends to occur in the case of product standards, while the latter situation tends to occur in the case of production regulations.

Background: Student dropouts are a major concern in developing countries; even before the pandemic, one out of three Brazilian students dropped out before graduating high school. School closures in the context of COVID-19 have been shown to magnify that problem, with at least seven million additional dropouts worldwide in 2020. Despite efforts from governments around the world to mitigate learning gaps by the time in-person classes return, interventions to motivate students to remain in school until then have been overlooked. In particular, behavioral nudges sent to parents’ cell phones through text messages had shown promise in preventing student dropouts in developing countries before the pandemic. Having said that, such nudges typically work by leading parents to show up in school to a greater extent and monitor teachers more closely – a mechanism that might not be meaningful in the absence of in-person classes. Methods: We conducted a cluster-randomized control trial with 18,256 high-school students in the State of Goiás, Brazil, randomizing 2/3 of them to receive behavioral nudges through text messages, between June and December 2020. The control group did not receive any messages. Within the treatment group, we additionally randomized students to variations in nudges’ content, to study whether behavioral insights linked to framing and social pressure would lead to higher impacts. We estimate the impacts of nudges on dropout risk over the course of the school year, using administrative data from the State Secretariat of Education on whether students took math and Portuguese exams each school quarter. We also estimate heterogeneous impacts of nudges by risk levels (higher for boys, sophomore and junior students, and those below-median first-quarter Portuguese GPA), by whether messages were sent to parents’ phones or directly to students, and by whether schools already offered online academic activities prior to the pandemic. Findings: Nudges decreased dropout risk by around 26% over the course of the school year. Effects increased with exposure, and were concentrated in students at the highest risk of dropouts. Nudges only worked when sent directly to students’ phones, and in schools that already offered online academic activities prior to the pandemic. Framing content in terms of the upside of graduating high school led to higher impacts than framing it in terms of the downside of dropping out. Alluding to peer motivation to return to in-person classes to leverage social pressure had no additional effects on dropout risk. Interpretation: Results show that behavioral nudges can partially mitigate the dramatic increase in student dropouts during school closures by keeping adolescents motivated to stay in school. The patterns of heterogeneous treatment effects are consistent with complementarities between motivation and academic instruction. All in all, our results showcase that insights from the science of adolescent psychology can be leveraged to shift developmental trajectories at a critical juncture, but also raise caution against indiscriminately applying behavioral insights derived from evaluations of similar interventions in contexts of in-person classes or static decision-making.

In this paper we use a novel approach to address issues of endogeneity in estimating a causal effect of leverage on risk taking by banks. Using data on local bank office deposits and local unemployment we construct an instrument to use in a regression of leverage on a measure of risk taking constructed from new issuance of loans. The results (i.) confirm that due to limited liability banks increase their risk taking after an exogenous increase in leverage, and (ii.) that an increase in deposit supply has a direct positive effect on risk taking by banks.

Preferences over risky alternatives can be elicited by different methods, including direct pairwise choices and willingness-to-accept valuations. The results are frequently at odds, casting doubts on the foundations of economics. We develop a stochastic choice model predicting when inconsistencies across elicitation methods should occur, the type of anomalies to be expected, what determines their magnitude, and whether they uncover a bias or not. While some anomalies can be traced back to individual biases, other apparent anomalies can occur in the absence of any actual behavioral bias, as a consequence of regularities in stochastic choice, risk attitudes, and experimental design. The model delivers new predictions that are confirmed in five experiments on the classical preference reversal phenomenon. Our novel empirical approach relies on utilities estimated out of sample, which allow us to test the model and also show that the bias in willingness-to-accept valuations is limited to long shots.

Modern trade agreements no longer emphasize basic trade liberalization but instead focus on international policy coordination in a much broader sense. In this paper we introduce the emerging literature on the political economy of such deep integration agreements. We organize our discussion around three main points. First, the political conflict surrounding trade agreements is moving beyond the classic antagonism of exporter interests who gain from trade and import-competing interests who lose from trade. Second, there is a more intense popular backlash against deep integration agreements than there was against shallow integration agreements. And third, the welfare economics of trade agreements have become more complex, in the sense that the insight that "free trade is good" is no longer sufficient as a guide to evaluating the efficiency of international agreements.

We study the assignment of objects in environments without transfers allowing for single-unit and general multi-unit demands, and any linear constraints, thus covering a wide range of applied environments, from school choice to course allocation. We establish the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments despite them failing the local non-satiation condition that previous studies of the Second Welfare Theorem relied on. We also prove a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. We thus show that the link between efficiency and decentralization through prices is valid in environments without transfers, and hence provide a foundation for pseudomarket- based market design by showing that the restriction to such mechanisms is without loss of generality.

One aspect of goal-directed behavior, which is known to be impaired in patients with schizophrenia (SZ), is balancing between exploiting a familiar choice with known reward value and exploring a lesser known but potentially more rewarding option. Despite its relevance to several symptom domains of SZ, this has received little attention in SZ research. In addition, while there is increasing evidence that SZ is associated with chronic low-grade inflammation, few studies have investigated how this relates to specific behaviors, such as balancing exploration and exploitation. We therefore assessed behaviors underlying the exploration-exploitation trade-off using a three-armed bandit task in 45 patients with SZ and 19 healthy controls (HC). This task allowed us to dissociate goal-unrelated (random) from goal-related (directed) exploration and correlate them with psychopathological symptoms. Moreover, we assessed a broad range of inflammatory proteins in the blood and related them to bandit task behavior. We found that, compared to HC, patients with SZ showed reduced task performance. This impairment was due to a shift from exploitation to random exploration, which was associated with symptoms of disorganization. Relative to HC, patients with SZ showed a pro-inflammatory blood profile. Furthermore, high sensitivity C-reactive protein (CRP) positively correlated with random exploration, but not with directed exploration or exploitation. In conclusion, we show that low-grade inflammation in patients with SZ is associated with random exploration, which can be considered a behavioral marker for disorganization. CRP may constitute a marker for severity of, and a potential treatment target for maladaptive exploratory behaviors.

This paper evaluates proposals for an annual wealth tax. While a dozen OECD countries levied wealth taxes in the recent past, now only three retain them, with only Switzerland raising a comparable fraction of revenue as recent proposals for a US wealth tax. Studies of these taxes sometimes, but not always, find a substantial behavioral response, including of saving, portfolio change, avoidance, and evasion, and the impact depends crucially on design features, especially the broadness of the base and enforcement provisions. Because the US proposals are very different from any previous wealth tax, experience in other countries offers only broad lessons, but we can gain insights from closely related taxes, such as the property and the estate tax, and from optimal tax analysis of the role of wealth taxation.

We show experimentally and theoretically that trust and contract enforcement can be complements, and identify the key mechanisms that drive this complementarity. In our experiments, the effect of improvements in contract enforcement is trust-dependent, and the effect of increases in trust is shaped by the strength of contract enforcement. We identify three key mechanisms underlying this complementarity: (1) heterogeneity in trustworthiness; (2) strength of contract enforcement affecting the ability to elicit reciprocal behavior from trustworthy types, and screen out untrustworthy types; (3) trust beliefs determining willingness to try such strategies.