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Contribution Details

Type Working Paper
Scope Discipline-based scholarship
Title Arrovian efficiency and auditability in the allocation of discrete resources
Organization Unit
  • Marek Pycia
  • M Utku Ünver
  • English
Institution CEPR
Series Name Discussion Paper Series
Number DP15377
ISSN 0265-8003
Number of Pages 32
Date 2020
Abstract Text In environments where heterogeneous indivisible resources are being allocated without monetary transfers and each agent has a unit demand, we show that an allocation mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient, i.e., it always selects the best outcome with respect to some Arrovian social welfare function if, and only if, the mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Re-interpreting Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in terms of auditability of the mechanism, we further show that these are precisely the mechanisms that are strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and auditable.
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Keywords Industrial organization