Not logged in.
Quick Search - Contribution
Contribution Details
| Type | Working Paper |
| Scope | Discipline-based scholarship |
| Title | Arrovian efficiency and auditability in the allocation of discrete resources |
| Organization Unit | |
| Authors |
|
| Language |
|
| Institution | CEPR |
| Series Name | Discussion Paper Series |
| Number | DP15377 |
| ISSN | 0265-8003 |
| Number of Pages | 32 |
| Date | 2020 |
| Abstract Text | In environments where heterogeneous indivisible resources are being allocated without monetary transfers and each agent has a unit demand, we show that an allocation mechanism is individually strategy-proof and Arrovian efficient, i.e., it always selects the best outcome with respect to some Arrovian social welfare function if, and only if, the mechanism is group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. Re-interpreting Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in terms of auditability of the mechanism, we further show that these are precisely the mechanisms that are strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and auditable. |
| Free access at | Official URL |
| Official URL | http://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15377 |
| Other Identification Number | merlin-id:20389 |
| PDF File |
Download from ZORA
|
| Export |
BibTeX
EP3 XML (ZORA)
|
| Keywords | Industrial organization |