Contributions in Merlin

This paper examines the relationship between parenthood and life satisfaction using longitudinal data on women from the German Socio-Economic Panel. Previous studies have focused on satisfaction differences between parents and comparable childless adults, mostly finding small and often negative effects of parenthood. These comparisons of ex-post similar individuals are problematic if a self-selection into motherhood exists. In this study we examine the selection issue in detail by exploiting the extended longitudinal dimension of the panel to track self-reported life satisfaction of women eventually to become mothers and of women eventually attaining a completed fertility of zero. We document that these groups' satisfaction paths diverge around five years before mothers' first birth, even after adjusting for differences in observables. In our estimations, we employ matching and regression techniques which account for this selection into motherhood. We find motherhood to be associated with substantial positive satisfaction gains.

Standard economic models view risk taking and time discounting as two independent dimensions of decision makers' behavior. However, mounting experimental evidence demonstrates the existence of robust and systematic interaction effects. There are striking parallels in patterns of risk taking and time discounting behavior, which suggests that there is a common underlying force driving these interactions. Here we show that decision makers' anticipation of something going wrong in the future conjointly with their proneness to probability weighting generates a unifying framework for explaining seven puzzling regularities: delay-dependent risk tolerance, aversion to sequential resolution of uncertainty, preferences for resolution timing, hyperbolic discounting, subadditive discounting, the differential discounting of risky and certain outcomes, and the order dependence of prospect valuation. Finally, we discuss the implications of our framework for understanding real-world behavior, such as the coexistence of underinsuring and overinsuring.

Understanding differences in business cycle phenomena between Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) and industrialized countries has been at the center of recent research on macroeconomic fluctuations. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of certain credit market imperfections in different EMEs. To this end, we develop a small open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework featuring both permanent and transitory productivity shocks, differentiated home and foreign goods, and endogenous exchange rate movements. Furthermore, our model incorporates liability dollarization as a particular form of financial frictions in EMEs. In this vein, we account for the fact that emerging markets traditionally have had difficulties in borrowing in domestic currency on international capital markets and thus allow for valuation effects in our analysis. We estimate our model using Bayesian techniques for a number of EMEs and thereby control for potential heterogeneity across countries. Contrary to previous studies in this strand of the literature, we include a (vector-)autoregressive measurement error component to capture off-model dynamics. Regarding business cycles in emerging markets, our main findings are that (i) even though we incorporate financial frictions in the framework, trend shocks are the main determinant of macroeconomic fluctuations, (ii) accounting for liability dollarization ameliorates the model fit, and (iii) valuation effects on average stabilize changes in the net foreign asset position.

Das Geschehen auf den Finanzmärkten hängt vom individuellen Verhalten ab, wird aber auch wesentlich bestimmt durch die Ausgestaltung des Finanzsystems, das heisst durch die Rollen, die den einzelnen Akteure zugewiesen werden, und durch die Regeln für die Interaktion der verschiedenen Rollen. Diese Arbeit behandelt nach einleitenden methodischen Vorbemerkungen zunächst die Frage der Verantwortung im gesamtwirtschaftlichen System (Kapitel 2) und beschäftigt sich dann mit der Verantwortung von einflussreichen Rollen und Subsystemen der Wirtschaft. Insbesondere wird diskutiert, was Verantwortung für die Ökonomie und die Finance als wissenschaftliches Disziplin bedeutet (Kapitel 3). Kapitel 4 setzt sich mit dem Finanzsystem auseinander und argumentiert, dass eine Inflation an Finanzprodukten und Finanztransaktionen zu Konfusion und negativen externen Effekten führt, die das Marktgeschehen in der realen Wirtschaft und im Finanzsektor stören. Im abschliessenden fünften Kapitel werden politische Massnahmen zur Herstellung von Ordnung im Finanzsystem dargelegt.

In small groups, norm enforcement is achieved through mutual punishment and reward. In large societies, norms are enforced by specialists such as government officials. However, not every public cause is overseen by states, for instance those organized at the international level. This paper shows how non-governmental norm enforcement can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. As a first stage, individuals voluntarily contribute to a non-governmental agency that produces an incentive system. The second stage is the provision of a public good on the basis of private contributions. The incentive system punishes and rewards deviations from the norm for contributions by means of public approval or disapproval of behavior. It is shown that, even in large populations, nongovernmental norm enforcement can be supported in a non-cooperative equilibrium of utility-maximizing individuals.

We construct a fully specified extensive form game that aptures competitive markets with adverse selection. In articular, it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists and that, in fact, when withdrawal is costless, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts. We then focus on robust equilibria that exist both when withdrawal costs are zero and when they are arbitrarily small but strictly positive. We show that the Miyazaki-Wilson contracts are the unique robust equilibrium outcome of our game. This outcome is always constrained efficient and involves cross-subsidization from low to high risk agents that is increasing in the share of low risks in the population under weak conditions on risk preferences.

We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential efficiency gains, but only with sustained cooperation. We then study the effect of exogenously varying growth rates on cooperation. Slow growth yields higher cooperation rates and welfare than fast growth, both for incumbents and entrants, which is consistent with optimistic self-reinforcing beliefs persisting under slower growth. Allowing incumbent group members to select growth rates also sustains high cooperation rates, but growth stalls at intermediate group sizes, leaving potential efficiency gains unrealized.

Covariance matrix estimation and principal component analysis (PCA) are two cornerstones of multivariate analysis. Classic textbook solutions perform poorly when the dimension of the data is of a magnitude similar to the sample size, or even larger. In such settings, there is a common remedy for both statistical problems: nonlinear shrinkage of the eigenvalues of the sample covariance matrix. The optimal nonlinear shrinkage formula depends on unknown population quantities and is thus not available. It is, however, possible to consistently estimate an oracle nonlinear shrinkage, which is motivated on asymptotic grounds. A key tool to this end is consistent estimation of the set of eigenvalues of the population covariance matrix (also known as the spectrum), an interesting and challenging problem in its own right. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that our methods have desirable finite-sample properties and outperform previous proposals.

In this paper we analyze R&D collaboration networks in industries where firms are competitors in the product market. Firms’ benefits from collaborations arise by sharing knowledge about a cost-reducing technology. By forming collaborations, however, firms also change their own competitive position in the market as well as the overall market structure. We analyze incentives of firms to form R&D collaborations with other firms and the implications of these alliance decisions for the overall network structure. We provide a general characterization of both equilibrium networks and endogenous production choices, and compare it to the efficient network architecture. We also allow for firms to differ in their technological characteristics, investigate how this affects their propensity to collaborate and study the resulting network architecture.

Many postulated relations in finance imply that expected asset returns strictly increase in an underlying characteristic. To examine the validity of such a claim, one needs to take the entire range of the characteristic into account, as is done in the recent proposal of Patton and Timmermann (2010). But their test is only a test for the direction of monotonicity, since it requires the relation to be monotonic from the outset: either weakly decreasing under the null or strictly increasing under the alternative. When the relation is non-monotonic or weakly increasing, the test can break down and falsely ‘establish’ a strictly increasing relation with high probability. We offer some alternative tests that do not share this problem. The behavior of the various tests is illustrated via Monte Carlo studies. We also present empirical applications to real data.