Contributions published at Finance (Kjell G. Nyborg)

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the interbank market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests support this hypothesis. While our data covers part of the recent crisis period, our results are not driven by the crisis. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets. Different financial assets have different degrees of moneyness (liquidity) and, as a result, there are systematic cross-sectional variations in trading activity as the price of liquidity, or the level of tightness, in the interbank market fluctuates.

What is the nature of imperfections in the market for liquidity? Studying bidder level data from European Central Bank (ECB) repo auctions, we find that this market appears to be informationally efficient in the sense that participants do not have private information about future short-term rates. However, auction allocations affect banks' subsequent behavior in a way that is consistent with a degree of allocational and operational inefficiency. Also, large bidders appear to have better access to the interbank market than small ones. Finally, the evidence suggests that the ECB uses collateral haircuts that do not equilibrate opportunity costs.

We document a general pattern in the euro area overnight interbank rate (EONIA) and analyze how German banks compared to other EMU banks respond to these predictable changes in the price for reserve holdings. At the beginning of the maintenance period, when the EONIA is typically above average, we observe that German banks hold substantially less reserves than their daily average required reserves. Thus in contrast to other EMU banks, German banks back load the fulfillment of their reserve requirements over the reserve maintenance period and thereby benefit from the general pattern in the EONIA. Looking at the disaggregate data we find than this is particularly the case for the Landesbanks. We argue that the end of the calender month effect in the EONIA may be driven by a temporary shortage of liquidity, relative to reserve requirements, at the beginning of the maintenance period (which coincides with the end of the calendar month).

This paper derives a tax-adjusted discount rate formula with a constant proportion leverage policy, investor taxes, and risky debt. The result depends on an assumption about the treatment of taxlosses in default. We identify the assumption that justiftes the textbook approach of discounting interest tax shields at the cost of debt. We contrast this with an alternative assumption that leads to the Sick (1990) result that these should be discounted at the riskless rate. These two approachesrepresent polar cases. Each generates its results by using a different simplifying assumption, and we explain what determines the correct treatment in practice. We also discuss implementation of the valuation procedure using the capital asset pricing model.

We contribute to the debate on the optimal design of multiunit auctions by developingand testing robust implications of the leading theory of uniform price auctions on the bid distributions submitted by individual bidders. The theory, which emphasizes market power, has little support in a data set of Finnish Treasury auctions. A reason may be that the Treasury acts strategically by determining supply after observing bids, apparently treating the auctions as a repeated game between itself and primary dealers. Bidder behavior and underpricing react to the volatility of bond returns in a way that suggests bidders adjust for the winner’s curse.

We examine the role of allocation rules in determining the set of equilibrium prices in uniform- price auctions. Beginning with Wilson (1979), the theoretical literature has argued that these auctions are subject to possible low equilibrium prices. We show that this is due to the way the asset is being divided. We focus on allocation rules that specify the way the asset is divided in cases of excess demand. This may have a dramatic effect on the set of equilibrium prices. In particular, we show that a simple allocation rule (pro rata) eliminates underpricing, while the allocation rule used in practice has a negative effect on equilibrium prices.

In uniform auctions, buyers chosse demand schedules as strategies and the same "market clearing" price for units awarded. Despite the widespread use of these auctions, the extant theory shows that they are susceptible to arbitrarily large underpricing. We make a realistic modification to the theory by letting prices, quantities, and bids be discrete. We show that underpricing can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a sufficiently small price tick size and a sufficiently large quantitity multiple. We also show how one might improve revenues by modifying the allocation rule. A trivial change in the design can have a dramatic impact on prices. Our conclusions are robust to bidders being capacity constrained. Finally, we examine supply uncertainty robust equilibria.

This article develops a theory of multiunit auctions where short squeezes can occur in the secondary market. Both uniform and discriminatory auctions are studied and bidders can submit multiple bids. We show that bidders with short and long preauction positions have different valuations in an otherwise common value setting. Discriminatory auctions lead to more short squeezing and higher revenue than uniform auctions, ceteris paribus. Asymptotically, as the auction size approaches infinity, the two formats lead to equivalent outcomes. Shorts employ more aggressive equilibrium bidding strategies. Most longs strategically choose to be passive. Free riding on a squeeze by small, long players has no impact on these results, but affects revenue in discriminatory auctions.

We study the relation of financial development and the pace of technological advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A firm which is financed by outside shareholders but run by managers has the prospect of a process innovation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation requires firing old management and hiring new with skills appropriate for the new technique. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in this game can be of two types. In entrenchment equilibrium once the new techniques has been announced old style management raises their dividend payout sufficiently to pre-empt the innovation. In maximum rent extraction equilibrium managers are unable or unwilling to match the impending productivity improvement and instead respond by increasing their perquisites for the remaining time of their tenure. We show that both equilibria involve several types of inefficiencies and can result in underinvestment in positive NPV projects. We discuss the role of financial innovation in reducing the inefficiencies identified.

This paper presents a descriptive analysis of the primary and secondary market for Finnish treasury bonds. The paper focuses on three issues. First, we report basic descriptive statistics such as auction volumes and secondary market yields and volumes. Second, we estimate the revenues earned by primary dealers from the treasury bond market. Third, we analyse the development of the price of the auctioned bonds, relative to other benchmark bonds, around the time of the auction. We find evidence of a price decrease in the auctioned bond series before the auction and a price increase after the auction. This pattern is strongest for 1992-1994 when Treasury funding needs were heavy and secondary market trading volume of treasury bonds was modest.

We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auctionawards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second,we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner 19s curse 13driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies.

The paper models fixed rate tenders, where a central bank offers to lend central bank funds to financial institutions. Bidders are constrained by the amount of collateral they have. We focus on the strategic interaction between bidding in the tender and trading in the interbank market after the tender, where short squeezes could occur. We examine how the design of the tender affects equilibrium bidding behavior and the incidence of short squeezes. Important elements in the analysis include the type of policy implemented by the central bank as well as bidders' initial endowments of liquidity and collateral. Three instruments for softening short squeezes are identified: the tender rate, the tender sizes, and admissible collateral. Increasing the tender rate or size tends to decrease the probability and severity of a short squeeze. The possibility of a short squeeze may induce bidders to oversubscribe even if the tender rate is higher than the competitive rate.

This paper describes three insolvency codes, those of the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and the United States (US) and compares their efficiency against a number of benchmarks. These codes have been chosen because they cover a broad spectrum of debtor- and creditor-oriented insolvency procedures. The paper also compares the plans of distressed firms' reorganizations both within and outside the formal bankruptcy process, including the size of write downs and creditors' claims and the deviations from absolute priority which have accrued both to equityholders and different classes of creditors. Some evidence of the costs of bankruptcy is also provided for each country.

We use wehn-issued transactions data to assess the Treasury's current experiment with uniform auctions, suggesting a higher information release, which should reduce pre-auction uncertainty and the winner's curse. Under uniform auctions, wehn-issued volatility falls after the auction and again after the outcome announcement. The pattern is the opposite for discriminatory auctions. This is further evidence that uniform auctions increase pre-auction information and lower the short squeeze. A direct comparison of markups in uniform and discriminatory auctions yields mixed results.

This study contributes to the current debate on central bank collateral frameworks. It relates to the idea that central bank collateral policies affect the types of securities being issued (Nyborg, 2016). It examines bond issuance patterns around downgrades of bank credit ratings to below a threshold uniquely important in the ECB's collateral eligibility rules. 58 out of 124 European banks lost their A- senior unsecured rating during the sample period 2007-2017. Banks fund an additional 3 % of total assets with covered bonds within the three years after the threshold downgrade (60 % of the unconditional mean). Market placed covered bond funding is mostly determined by bank ratings and bank business model, retained covered bond funding by the financial health of a bank. This article discusses the results in the context of the corporate finance literature, theories of asset encumbrance as well as the systemic implications.

Focusing on the QE program of the Eurosystem in the covered bond market, this study shows that yields of eligible and closely matched ineligible bonds diverge in response to central bank buying activity. The magnitude of this price pressure depends on the country of issuance and is not there in all euro area countries. In countries with high price pressure, banks issue abnormal amounts of bonds in the first two years after the start of the QE program, not before and not after. The source of price pressure is central bank buying activity as it is larger in countries with on average smaller bond sizes and its effect declines after persisting for 12 months as buying activity abates. These findings suggest mispricing between similar bonds is an important factor in explaining abnormal bond issuance during a QE program.