Contributions published at Services & Operations Management (Helmut Max Dietl)

This paper analyzes the market entry of Red Parcel Post, a new player in the German Business-to-Business (B2B) parcel market. Currently there are four large service providers in the German B2B parcel market. Each of these incumbent providers operates - albeit with varying degrees of automation - with a classical multi-hub-and-spoke network. Red Parcel Post plans to enter the B2B parcel market with a completely new parcel delivery system for the delivery of B2B parcels throughout Germany based on a new transport network design, and RFID- and GPS-based operations. Such operations shall enable the entrant to offer new services to potential customers and realize lower costs and prices than the established firms. We describe the market and contrast the incumbents' and the entrant's business strategies. Moreover, we develop a model to analyze the effect of the entrant's market entry on competitive strategies, market shares, prices, costs and profits. First, we solve the game-theoretic model analytically to derive qualitative results. In a second step, we simulate market entry and competition by calibrating the model with data from the German B2B market illustrating the impact of market entry in various scenarios.

This paper presents a two-period model of talent investments in which two clubs compete for a contest prize. We show that multiple equilibria are possible, using a closed-loop approach with strictly convex costs: The large-market club invests in both periods more than the small-market club or the small-market club invests in both periods more than the large-market club. In the case of an open-loop approach with strictly convex costs, however, the large-market club always invests more. The open-loop and closed-loop equilibria coincide if costs are linear.

Historically, European team sports leagues were run by their respective national and international associations and were legally independent from the professional clubs playing in these leagues. Recently, European leagues have adopted an organizational form similar to their North American counterparts who are organized since their beginning in a cooperative-like manner. Based on a comparative institutional analysis, we explain the advantages of the cooperative form of league organization over contractual governance. With our four-stage game-theoretic model, we show that contractual governance of sports leagues leads to larger investment distortions than cooperative league organization.

Anlässlich seiner Magglinger Tagung vom Mai 2007 hat sich der Arbeitskreis Sportökonomie e.V. sehr intensiv mit ökonomischen Fragen rund um den Fußball beschäftigt. Fußball ist in den meisten Teilen der Welt die mit Abstand populärste Sportart. Diese Popularität lässt sich nicht zuletzt auf die Einfachheit des Fußballspiels zurückführen. Gemessen an anderen Sportarten hat das Fußballspiel nicht nur sehr einfache Regeln, sondern es kommt im Extremfall fast ohne Ausrüstungsinvestitionen aus, denn wer einen Ball, ein paar Freunde und die Abgrenzung für zwei symbolische Goals organisieren kann, kann auf jeder freien Fläche dieser Welt in die Faszination des Spiels eintauchen und die fußballtypische Leidenschaft entwickeln. Wesentlich komplexer als das Fußballspiel selbst sind die ökonomischen Gesetzmäßigkeiten und Zusammenhänge, die das wirtschaftliche Geschehen im Fußball bestimmen. Der vorliegende Band soll dem Leser helfen, diese Komplexität zu reduzieren und die wirtschaftlichenDimensionen des Fußballspiels besser zu verstehen.

Dieser Artikel widmet sich der Bestimmung kurz- bis mittelfristiger Determinanten der Nachfrage nach Sportunterhaltung im TV. Mögliche Einflussfaktoren auf die Zuschauerzahlen einer Fußball-Highlightsendung werden sportökonomisch hergeleitet und ausführlich beschrieben, bevor ihre Bedeutung ökonometrisch überprüft wird. Die häufig diskutierte Unsicherheit des Spiel- oder Saisonausgangs erweist sich im Ergebnis als bedeutungslos. Signifikanten Einfluss auf die Nachfragehöhe besitzen hingegen der Sendezeitpunkt, die Möglichkeiten alternativer Freizeitgestaltung sowie einige grundlegende Unterhaltungsdimensionen des sportlichen Geschehens. Es zeigt sich dabei auch, dass nur ein Teil der Konsumenten sich im Vorfeld der Highlight-Sendungen über das Spielgeschehen informiert.

This paper outlines and analyzes different competitive strategies for an established platform provider in a two-sided market to defend against various forms of attack. Taking into account the characteristics of two-sided markets, we consider strategies based on product innovation and network effects, process innovation and pricing, multiple platforms, and switching costs. Network effects introduce dynamics that can quickly displace an incumbent platform. However, a platform provider can also use network effects to its advantage, entrenching itself firmly in the market by using appropriate strategies. These strategies are developed theoretically and illustrated by example of the mail industry.

It’s not easy being lean. And for many companies, getting lean right the first time does not always happen. Lean is a management philosophy focused on identifying and eliminating waste throughout a product’s entire value stream, extending not only within the organization but also along the company’s supply chain network. Lean promises significant benefits in terms of waste reduction, and increased organizational and supply chain communication and integration. Implementing lean, however, and achieving the levels of organizational commitment, employee autonomy, and information transparency needed to ensure its success is a daunting task. This article describes in detail two lean implementation projects within the same company: a global manufacturer of food processing machines and equipment. The first project was a failure, while the second is viewed as a success. Examining these projects in detail, the major criteria and conditions that led to either lean failure or lean success are identified. Based on these conditions, we highlight a number of lessons learned, all of which may help other organizations ensure the success of their own lean implementation and improvement efforts.

Transfer restrictions have a long tradition in professional sports but came under heavy attack in recent years (e.g. Bosman ruling, Monti system). Based on a bargaining model with stochastic player productivity, we show that less restrictive transfer rules reallocate ex post bargaining power from players to clubs. This reallocation is efficient and in the ex ante self-interest of players. The right to charge transfer fees enables clubs to insure their players. The players, in turn, benefit by converting risky future income into riskless current income. Overall, player utility is higher under more than under less restrictive transfer rules.

Ein unternehmensübergreifendes Verständnis von Organisation ist von zentraler Bedeutung. Denn es hat sich gezeigt, dass die Organisation des Unternehmensumfeldes, z. B. Wettbewerbspolitik, und die Organisation an den Grenzen der Unternehmung - z.B. Outsourcing, Kooperationen - erheblichen Einfluss auf den Erfolg und die Gestaltung von Unternehmensstrukturen haben. Das Lehrbuch wurde in der 5. Auflage aktualisiert und ergänzt um die Bereiche `Dienstleistungs-/Service-Organisation` und `Organisation von Wertschöpfung`.

This article presents a model of talent investments where two clubs compete for prizes. Our model is based on a general class of cost functions with a constant elasticity of marginal costs with respect to investments. The analysis finds that reduced revenue sharing improves competitive balance. Furthermore, we show that a higher elasticity of marginal costs with respect to investments enhances competitive balance and simultaneously reduces the negative effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance.

This paper provides a theoretical model of a team sports league based on contest theory and studies the welfare effect of gale revenue sharing. It derives two counterintuitive results. First, it challenges the "invariance proposition" by showing that revenue sharing reduces competitive balance and thus produces a more unbalanced league. Second, the paper concludes that a lower degree of competitive balance compared with the noncooperative league equilibrium yields a higher level of social welfare and club profits. Combining both results, it concludes that gate revenue sharing increases social welfare and club profits in our model.