Contributions published at Services & Operations Management (Helmut Max Dietl)

null

null

This paper constructs and analyzes open-loop equilibria in an infinitely repeated Tullock contest in which two contestants contribute efforts to accumulate individual asset stocks over time. To investigate the transitional dynamics of the contest in the case of a general cost function, we linearize the model around the steady state. Our analysis shows that optimal asset stocks and their speed of convergence to the steady state crucially depend on the elasticity of marginal effort costs, the discount factor and the depreciation rate. In the case of a cost function with a constant elasticity of marginal costs, a lower discount factor, a higher depreciation rate and a lower elasticity imply a higher speed of convergence to the steady state. We further analyze the effects of second prizes in the contest. A higher prize spread increases individual and aggregate asset stocks, but does not alter the balance of the contest in the long run. During the transition, a higher prize spread increases asset stocks, produces a more balanced contest in each period and increases the speed of convergence to the steady state.

The implementation of lean production remains popular among industrial companies, and the requirement for individualised steps in its implementation is widely accepted; however, research has not yet considered the different process choices available to the companies. The conclusions drawn from the automotive industry’s mass production environment may be misleading, given the different conditions of many other industries. We therefore compare case data from a craft producer with the rich, case-study based literature of mass producer companies that highlight the transformation from mass to lean production. We derive a list of specific challenges a craft producer must approach using a different strategy than a mass producer. This study adds to the lean production theory by demonstrating how different manufacturing process choices influence the lean transformation process and its successful implementation. It provides specific propositions concerning the transformation to lean by considering the different processes of craft and mass production companies. Furthermore, the case study gives an in-depth understanding of the challenges a craft-oriented company faces when becoming lean.

It is a central tenet in the literature on organizational change that firms need to explore novel courses of action in order to adapt and survive. Should firms thus exhibit a “pro-innovation bias” when evaluating novel decision alternatives? or should firms rather assess new opportunities as objectively as possible? our analysis of a simulation model suggests that a pro-innovation bias can have exploration-enhanc- ing effects that increase long-run performance in complex and stable environments, but can also decrease performance substantially if the bias becomes too pronounced. However, under most other conditions, an unbiased, objective evaluation of novel opportunities is most effective. We also identify a set of contingency factors that strongly affect the value of a pro-innovation bias, which may explain why it is that we see so few firms with such a bias.

Professional football clubs earn most of their revenues from four sources: sale of broadcasting rights, matchday revenues, merchandising, and sponsorship. The relative importance of these sources differs among clubs and leagues. Economists often argue that the ability of professional football clubs to generate revenues depends to a large extent on their legal structure. In this paper we analyze the effect of different legal structures, such as private company, public company, members’ association, on sponsorship. Based on the platform theory we introduce a model of value creation in professional football. After elaborating the property rights situation for each of the legal structures we show the direct and indirect effects on the generation of sponsorship revenues. We theoretically proof the members’ association to be the favorable legal structure with regard to sponsorship. The lack of hold-up risks for the stakeholders and the strong position of the fans are the major reasons for the superiority of this non-profit legal structure.

null

Executive pay regulation is widely discussed as a measure to reduce financial mismanagement in corporations. We show that the professional team sports industry, the only industry with substantial experience in the regulation of compensation arrangements, provides valuable insights for the regulation of executive pay. Based on the experience from professional sports leagues, we develop implications for the corporate sector regarding the establishment and enforcement of executive pay regulation as well as the level, structure, and rigidity of such regulatory measures.

This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weighted sum of profits and wins (utility maximization). The model analyzes how more win-oriented behavior of certain clubs affects talent investments, competitive balance, and club profits. Moreover, in contrast to traditional models, the authors show that revenue sharing does not always reduce investment incentives due to the dulling effect. The authors identify a new effect of revenue sharing called the ‘‘sharpening effect.’’ In the presence of the sharpening effect (dulling effect), revenue sharing enhances (reduces) investment incentives and improves (deteriorates) competitive balance in the league.

In parallel with liberalization, sector-specific regulation in network industries has become a widely discussed topic among academics, policy makers, industry economists and regulators themselves. The issue of these debates has usually been on whether such regulation is necessary and if so what its optimal design should be. Some argue for complete deregulation (i.e., the complete abolishment of sector-specific regulations), whereas others propose reregulations, that is the replacement of pre-existing (monopoly) regulations by new regulations aiming at safeguarding service levels and competition. The resulting compromise is often somewhere in between; the liberalization process usually entails the partial replacement and realignment of sector-specific regulatory intervention by the disciplining forces of competition protected by competition law. Consequently, competition law and sector-specific regulation play complementary roles. In this paper, we present a general economic framework to assess regulatory remedies in network industries. Therein, liberalization, or more generally market access regulation, can be assessed as well. It provides a foundation and explanation of current sector-specific regulations in place.

The financing of universal service provision in the postal sector has traditionally relied on granting the universal service provider a reserved area. Together with growing electronic substitution, current liberalization policies promoting competitive entry may put the traditional universal service at risk. Hence, there is an increased interest in knowing the cost of universal service provision. The third EC postal directive proposes a calculation approach to separately determine the net cost of a universal service obligation and to compensate the universal service provider (USP). This paper discusses the interaction between universal service costing and financing and shows that the EC approach may result in distorted results. It also quantifies the effects based on a model calibration with Swiss data. The results show that separate costing and financing leads to a considerable under-compensation of the USP if there is a compensation fund to which every operator contributes. The USP is over-compensated if it is exempt from contributing to the fund (pay or play mechanism). The problem of under- or overcompensation can be resolved by an integrated computation of the net cost that includes the competitive effects of the financing mechanism. Such an integrated approach results in a fair compensation of the USP.

Im Dezember 2010 haben die eidgenössischen Räte die neue Postgesetzgebung verabschiedet. Die vorliegenden Überlegungen stellen diese Reform in den Kontext der aktuellen Entwicklungen und Herausforderungen im Postsektor. Dabei wird aufgezeigt, in welchem Spannungsfeld sich die Postgesetzgebung befindet und welche Zielkonflikte sich dahinter verbergen. Heute prägen drei langfristig zentrale Trends den Postsektor: Liberalisierung, Globalisierung und Digitalisierung. Sie sind Anlass für die Totalrevision der Postgesetzgebung. Dadurch wird die bisherige Sonderstellung der Post relativiert; gleichwohl bleibt sie als Grundversorgerin im Besitz des Bundes auch künftig ein Unternehmen, das vielfältigen politischen Ansprüchen gerecht werden muss.

n this paper we set out a holistic approach that incorporates recent developments in assessing the net cost of the USO and presents a robust methodology for practical implementation. We analyse the issues relating to assessing the net costs of the USO with particular focus on the benefits associated with USO and current empirical approaches to calculating the net costs. We then present an overview of approaches that have been applied in various countries and highlight their strengths and shortcomings in light of the necessarily theoretical aspects discussed in the first part of the paper. Finally, we present a practical approach that we believe assesses robustly the net cost of the USO.

The focus of our paper is on the competitive effects of the proposed VAT regime relative to selected alternatives. We also highlight the welfare effects of various VAT scenarios. While an exempt operator cannot reclaim VAT paid on inputs (relevant for non-labor inputs only) and therefore faces higher costs ceteris paribus, an important fraction of customers of non-exempt operators will not be able to deduct VAT themselves. Hence, the exempt incumbent operator has on the one hand a cost disadvantage, and on the other, a price advantage. The net effect will depend on the fraction of non-labor inputs relative to the fraction of non-rated customers. We report market shares, optimum prices, tax revenue and welfare in a liberalized postal market. The various scenarios differ by the operators’ VAT status. We also take into account the fraction of non-rated customers that cannot deduct VAT themselves. The paper sheds light on the main competitive impact of VAT policies while showing the consequences on overall welfare. We show that the results are very sensitive to the operators’ labor policies. Consequently, VAT exemptions have a different impact in countries with different labor regulations. The comprehensive treatment of competition and welfare enables us to provide guidance on how to resolve the policy trade-off between consumer surplus, government tax revenue, and a level playing field in liberalized postal markets.

istortions under the value-added tax (VAT) arise partly from the exemption of specific services and sectors. This paper develops an analytical model that is applicable to any sector characterized by asymmetric VAT exemptions of services and activities. We analyze the effects of such asymmetric tax regimes on market shares, optimal prices, tax receipts, and social welfare. The analytical model shows how asymmetric VAT exemptions distort competition by strengthening the competitive position of non-rated firms. The net effect of such tax exemptions depends on the fraction of VAT-rated inputs versus the fraction of non-rated customers. We further elucidate main competitive impacts of VAT policies, while showing their consequences on overall welfare by presenting simulation results based on a calibrated quantitative model of a selected sector. Our paper provides guidance on how to resolve the policy trade-off between a level playing field in the market, consumer surplus, and government tax revenue.