Contributions published at Department of Economics (Florian Scheuer)

The point of departure for this contribution is a problem common to all Western healthcare systems, namely the deficiency of their basic building block, the physician-patient relationship. This deficiency opens up a market for complementary agents in healthcare, ranging from medical associations to the central government. While Germany has traditionally put the emphasis on medical associations as the dominant complementary agent (DCA), it is shifting towards the central government. Switzerland, on the other hand, traditionally has relied on the cantonal governments and is now moving towards competing (quasi-) private health insurers that would function as DCAs. Thus, managed care, which is a means through which to reshape the physician-patient relationship, is used quite differently in the 2 countries, with differing expected outcomes and different consequences for the pharmaceutical industry.

The purpose of this contribution is to investigate why private insurance of the risk of long-term care (LTC) has known little market success in major industrialized countries, even among the relatively well-to-do. Using a principal-agent framework, it shows that the purchase of LTC insurance by the parent (the principal) is likely to diminish the amount of LTC provided by the major caregivers; namely children earning a comparatively low wage in the labor market. Anticipating this moral hazard effect, the parent is predicted to renounce the purchase of LTC coverage in many cases. This finding throws serious doubts on the welfare effects of recent moves to introduce compulsory social LTC insurance, as, for example, in Germany.

Reviews the book `Health Benefits at Work. An Economic and Political Analysis of Employment-Based Health Insurance,' by Mark V. Pauly.

In this paper, I discuss the interpretation of qualification related income differentials from income functions that control for age rather than the theoretically more appropriate variable years of labour market experience. I reestimate income functions for New Zealand that were originally reported by Maani (1997) with changed specification, and I update her results by also estimating an income function with data from the 1996 census.

This paper is concerned with the problems of posterior simulation and model choice for Poisson panel data models with multiple random effects. Efficient algorithms based on Markov chain Monte Carlo methods for sampling the posterior distribution are developed. A new parameterization of the random effects and fixed effects is proposed and compared with a parameterization in common use, and computation of marginal likelihoods and Bayes factors via Chib’s (1995) method is also considered. The methods are illustrated with two real data applications involving large samples and multiple random effects.

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The winner?take?all nature of all?pay auctions makes the outcome sensitive to decision errors, which we introduce with a logit formulation. The equilibrium bid distribution is a fixed point: the belief distributions that determine expected payoffs equal the choice distributions determined by expected payoffs. We prove existence, uniqueness, and symmetry properties. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium, the comparative statics of the logit equilibrium are intuitive: rent dissipation increases with the number of players and the bid cost. Overdissipation of rents is impossible under full rationality but is observed in laboratory experiments. Our model predicts this property.

I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder's type. Multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions may exist that differ in allocation, efficiency and revenue. The sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders. The sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods. If a particular good, say alpha, is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale, then auction revenue and the price of good alpha are higher when good alpha is sold first.

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We analyse the stability properties of mixed equilibria in 2×2 asymmetric games under evolutionary dynamics. With the standard replicator dynamics these equilibria are stable but not asymptotically stable. We modified the replicator dynamics by introducing players of two types: myopies — like in the standard replicator dynamics — and best responders. The behaviour of the latter is described by a continuos time version of the best reply dynamics. Asymptotic convergence under theModified Replicator Dynamics is proved by identifying a strictly decreasing Ljapunov function. We argue that the finding has important implications to justify the use of economic models with mixed strategy equilibria.

The paper presents an empirical analysis of a model of endogenous growth and innovation with unequal incomes and hierarchical consumer demand. The theoretical model predicts a positive impact of income inequality on product diversity. The impact of inequality on per-capita growth may be positive or negative depending upon the assumptions about productivity growth, where the standard assumption that productivity is positively related to product diversity implies a positive impact. In the empirical part, indices for absolute and relative product diversity are calculated from ICP-expenditure data. The empirical evidence shows that a significant positive relationship exists between income inequality and relative product diversity and that the relationship between income inequality and economic growth is negative and significant. The results lead to the conclusion that the diversity-productivity relationship used in new growth theory has to be treated with scepticism.

This paper tests for the importance of non-pecuniary costs of unemployment using a longitudinal data-set on life-satisfaction of working-age men in Germany. We show that unemployment has a large detrimental effect on satisfaction after individual specific fixed effects are controlled for. The non-pecuniary effect is much larger than the effect that stems from the associated loss of income.

This paper offers a theory of development that links the degree of market incompleteness to capital accumulation and growth. At early stages of development, the presence projects limits the degree of risk spreading (diversification) that the economy can achieve. The desire to avoid highly risky investments slows down capital accumulation, and the inability to diversify idiosyncratic risk introduces a large amount of uncertainty in the growth process. The typical development pattern will consist of a lengthy period of “primitive accumulation” with highly variable output, followed by takeoff and financial deepening and, finally, steady growth. “Lucky” countries will spend relatively less time in the primitive accumulation stage and develop faster. Although all agents are price takers and there are no technological spillovers, the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient because individuals do not take into account their impact on others' diversification opportunities. We also show that our results generalize to economies with international capital flows.

Comments on the article `How US Antirust Can Go Astray: The Brand Name Prescription Drug Litigation,' by F.M. Scherer. Discussion of the issue of patent protection; Uniform monopoly price; Summary of price differentiation between groups of consumers.

The recent economic literature on the incidence of various forms of post-secondary on-the-job and off-the-job training in Germany and the United States, as well as on the effects of training on wages, inequality, and labor mobility is surveyed. Young workers in Germany receive substantially more company-based (apprenticeship) training than United States workers. In the United States, high turnover deters firms from investing in general skills while it results in improved job matches. The received literature consents that key institutional elements required to make the German apprenticeship system work are absent in the United States.