Sandra Nocera, Dario Bonato, Harry Telser, The contingency of contingent valuation: how much are people willing to pay against Alzheimer's disease?, International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Vol. 2 (3), 2002. (Journal Article)
The present work focuses on the choice of the elicitation technique within a contingent valuation (CV) framework. We simultaneously apply three different elicitation techniques to elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) values for three programs against Alzheimer's disease. First, the dichotomous choice approach is used, which is the standard procedure. However, giving respondents only a yes/no response alternative seems to result in overestimated WTP values. Therefore, we secondly apply the dissonance-minimizing format which screens respondents for their preferences and thus avoids possible yea-saying and protest answers against the payment vehicle. The third format, a modified version of the payment card, allows respondents to express a level of voting certainty and to make less of a commitment. With our findings we show that a well-designed CV method is a suitable instrument for helping decision makers in the health care sector and that the Swiss population favors highly a program which improves the situation of informal caregivers. |
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H Egger, P Egger, How international outsourcing drives up Eastern European wages, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (Review of World Economics), Vol. 138 (1), 2002. (Journal Article)
This paper analyzes the effects of intermediate goods trade on the development of real wages in Central and Eastern European manufacturing. The empirical findings show that world exports in intermediate goods of the CEEC exhibit a negative impact on wages, and imports a positive one. Since 1993, intermediate goods trade between the EU and the CEEC accounted for an increase in wages being most pronounced in Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic. |
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H Egger, Unemployment may be lower if unions bargain over wages and employment, Labour, Vol. 16 (1), 2002. (Journal Article)
This paper addresses the question under which circumstances unemployment can be lower if unions bargain over wages and employment in a general equilibrium framework. Thereby, it turns out that the unemployment rate may negatively depend on the wage rate, if the unemployment compensation scheme contains a constant real term in addition to the replacement ratio component. This is, compared with a pure replacement ratio scheme, the more plausible formalization of the real world’s compensation systems, at least for European countries. Besides the theoretical analysis, the paper also derives political implications by identifying the relevant parameters for the decision on whether weakening unions will be a good strategy for an economy to overcome its unemployment problem. |
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H Egger, International outsourcing in a two-Sector Heckscher-Ohlin model, Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 17 (4), 2002. (Journal Article)
This paper analyzes the distributional effects of international outsourcing in a two sector Heckscher-Ohlin type model if both sectors get economical access to cost-saving international outsourcing. Thereby, it is shown that if both sectors are engaged in international outsourcing in equilibrium, the cost-saving effects of outsourcing as well as the factor contents of the outsourced fragments are relevant for the factor price effects. Concerning the Pareto-criterion the main finding is that a Pareto-improving factor price impact of international outsourcing cannot be excluded from a theoretical point of view. |
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Takeshi Momi, Excess Demand Functions with Incomplete Markets: A Global Result, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 96, 2002. (Working Paper)
"The purpose of this paper is to give a global characterization of excess demand functions in a two period exchange economy with in-completenreal asset markets. We show that continuity, homogeneity and Walras law characterize the aggregate excess demand functions on any compact price set which maintains the dimension of the budget set." |
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M Kosfeld, Why shops close again: An evolutionary perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours, European Economic Review, Vol. 46 (1), 2002. (Journal Article)
This paper introduces a new perspective on the deregulation of shopping hours based on ideas from evolutionary game theory. We study a retail economy where shopping hours have been deregulated recently. It is argued that first, the deregulation leads to a coordination problem between store owners and customers, and second, the ‘solution’ to this problem depends on the specific cost structure of stores and the preferences of customers. In particular, it may happen that, even if extended shopping hours are Pareto efficient, stores and customers do not succeed in coordinating on this equilibrium. The analysis explains the observation in Germany, where shopping hours have been deregulated recently, that store owners tend to go back to the former shopping hours again. Moreover, it emphasizes the important role of advertisement campaigns as a signalling device. |
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Simon Gächter, Arno Riedl, Moral Property Rights in Bargaining, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 113, 2002. (Working Paper)
"In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers seem to hold strong entitlements that shape negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the gap by designing an experiment that allows us to measure the entitlements and to track them through the whole negotiation process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a moral property right that is influential independent of negotiators legal property rights." |
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Urs Fischbacher, Christian Thöni, Excess Entry in an Experimental Winner-Take-All Market, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 86, 2002. (Working Paper)
"""Winner-Take-All""-markets, i.e. markets in which the relative and not the absolute performance is decisive, have gained in importance. Such markets have a tendency to provoke inefficiently many entries. We investigate the functioning of such markets with the help of experiments and show that there are even more inefficient entries than predicted by the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, this effect increases with group size. Quantal response equilibrium predicts the increase in group size but fails to predict the excess entry in the smaller group. We show that the excess entry is not caused by coordination failures. Furthermore, individual entry behavior is not significantly linked to risk preferences. We discuss several concepts that might explain the observed excess entry." |
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Aleksander Berentsen, Guillaume Rocheteau, On the Efficiency of Monetary Exchange: How Divisibility of Money Matters, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 101, 2002. (Working Paper)
We use alternative assumptions about the divisibility of goods and money and thenability of agents to use lotteries on money to investigate to what extent the indivisibility of money is the cause for the typically inefficient production and consumption decisions in search-theoretic models of money. Our framework potentially generates three types of inefficiencies: the no-trade inefficiency, where no trade takes place even though it would be socially efficient to trade; and the too-much-trade and too-little-trade inefficiencies, where the quantities produced and exchanged are either larger or smaller than what the solution to a social planner's problem would mandate. It is shown that while the no-trade and the too-much-trade inefficiencies are caused by the indivisibility of money, the too-little-trade inefficiency remains even when money is divisible unless it is sufficiently valued. |
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Aleksander Berentsen, Guillaume Rocheteau, Money and the Gains from Trade, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 100, 2002. (Working Paper)
"This paper studies the role of money in environments where in each meeting there isna double coincidence of real wants. Traders who meet at random finance their purchases through current production, the sale of divisible money or both. It is shown that in the absence of valued money if traders have asymmetric tastes for each others good, they produce and exchange socially ine .cient quantities. With valued money, however, traders exchange efficient quantities if the asymmetry of tastes is not too large. It is shown that the gains from trade in the monetary economy are strictly greater than those in the corresponding barter economy, that the Friedman rule holds, and that the allocation of resources in the monetary economy converges to the allocation in the barter economy as the growth rate of the money supply is increased." |
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Aleksander Berentsen, Guillaume Rocheteau, Money and Information, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 99, 2002. (Working Paper)
This paper investigates the role of fiat money in decentralized markets, where producers have private information about the quality of the goods they supply. Money is divisible, terms of trade are determined endogenously, and agents can finance their consumption with money or with real production. When the fraction of high quality producers in the economy is given, money promotes the production of high-quality goods, which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously. When this fraction is endogenous, however, we find that money can be valued even though it decreases welfare relative to the barter equilibrium. The origin of this inefficiencynis that money provides consumption insurance to low-quality producers, which can result in a higher fraction of low-quality producers in the monetary equilibrium. Finally, we find that most often agents acquire more information in the monetary equilibrium. Consequently, money is welfare-enhancing because it promotes usefulnproduction and exchange, but not because it saves information costs. |
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Mathias Hoffmann, The relative dynamics of investment and the current account in the G7-economies, Economic Journal, Vol. 111 (471), 2001. (Journal Article)
This paper contributes to the empirics of the intertemporal approach to the current account. We use a cointegrated VAR framework to identify permanent and transitory components of country-specific and global shocks. Our approach allows us to investigate empirically the sensitivity to persistence implied by many forward-looking models and our results shed new light on the excess volatility of investment encountered by Glick and Rogoff (1995). In G7 data, we find the relative current-account and investment response to be in line with the intertemporal approach. |
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Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran, Does Money Illusion Matter?, American Economic Review, Vol. 91 (5), 2001. (Journal Article)
This paper shows that a small amount of individual-level money illusion may cause considerable aggregate nominal inertia after a negative nominal shock. In addition, our results indicate that negative and positive nominal shocks have asymmetric effects because of money illusion. While nominal inertia is quite substantial and long lasting after a negative shock, it is rather small after a positive shock. |
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Bruno Frey, Flexible Citizenship for a Global Society, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 94, 2001. (Working Paper)
States are ill equipped to meet the challenges of a globalized world. The concept of citizenship with its rights and obligations, including the allegiance owed, is too narrowly defined to exist only between individuals and a state. Today, people identify with, and pay allegiance to, many organizations beyond the state. This paper suggests that citizenship could be extended further and be possible between individuals and quasi-governmental organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations, such as churches, clubs, interest groups, functional organizations and profit firms. Due to the larger set of types of citizenship individuals could choose from, their preferences would be better fulfilled and, due to the competition for citizens induced among organizations, the efficiency of public activity would be raised. |
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Ernst Fehr, Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 95, 2001. (Working Paper)
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understandingnincentives, contracts and organisations. Yet, they constrained their attention to a very narrow and empirically questionable view of human motivation. The purpose of this paper is to show that this narrow view of human motivation may severely limit understanding the determinants and effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance with rules. In addition, these motives may generate very powerful incentives themselves. |
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Bruno Frey, Matthias Benz, Ökonomie und Psychologie: eine Übersicht, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 92, 2001. (Working Paper)
"Moderne Ökonomie und Sozialpsychologie beschäftigen sich beide mit der Erklärung menschlichen Verhaltens. Dieser Artikel gibt eine Übersicht über die Interaktion zwischen den beiden Wissenschaften. Zum einen werden einige grundlegende Aspekte dieser Beziehung diskutiert; zum anderen werden die Ergebnisse neuerer empirischer Arbeiten dargestellt. Im Zentrum stehen Erweiterungen des ökonomischen Verhaltensmodells aufgrund (i) der begrenzten Rationalität der Menschen, (ii) des begrenzten Eigennutzes der Individuen und (iii) einem begrenzten Nutzenkonzept, welches der Ökonomik zugrunde liegt." |
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Bruno Frey, Alois Stutzer, What can Economists learn from Happiness Research? Revised Version, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 80, 2001. (Working Paper)
Over the past few years, there has been a steadily increasing interest on the part of economists in happiness research. We argue that reported subjective well-being is a satisfactory empirical approximation to individual utility and that happiness research is able to contribute important insights for economics. We report how the economic variables income, unemployment and inflation affect happiness as well as how institutional factors, in particular the type of democracy and the extent of government decentralization, systematically influence how satisfied individuals are with their life. We discuss some of the consequences for economic policy and for economic theory. |
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Reto Schleiniger, Money Illusion and the Double Dividend in the Short Run, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 93, 2001. (Working Paper)
In their seminal paper, Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994) elucidate why an ecological tax reform will not yield a double dividend, i.e. fails to increase the efficiency of the tax system. The present paper slightly modifies the Bovenberg and De Mooij model by introducing money illusion. With this modification, an environmental tax reform that raises the price level may generate a double dividend, since the additional tax on the dirty good does not reduce labor supply. A prerequisite for the double dividend to occur is a sufficiently small elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty consumption. Moreover, accounting for money illusion always reduces the intertemporal gross cost of the tax reform. |
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Bruno Frey, Liliput oder Leviathan? Der Staat in der Globalisierten Wirtschaft, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 85, 2001. (Working Paper)
Globalization is often seen to result in a smaller (Liliput) or larger (Leviathan) state. But future public activity will be more flexible. Persons have multiple identities. They can be citizens of sub- and supra-national jurisdictions, semi- and non-governmental organizations and private units, even profit-oriented firms. Such attachment may be temporary, multiple or partial. To actively choose strengthens loyalty and identification, which raises the willingness to pay for publicly supplied services (in the sense of quasi-voluntary taxation). On the supply side, Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ) will develop. Such flexibility of the future European integration will make it successful. |
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Antoni Bosch-Doménech, Maria Saez Marti, Cycles of aggregate behavior in theory and experiment, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 36 (2), 2001. (Journal Article)
We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game (which we interpret as a borrower–lender relation), we study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching setup, and we test its predictions. The theoretical model provides conditions for changes in qualitative aggregate behavior in response to variations in structural parameters. While it turns out that Nash equilibrium is not a reliable predictor of average aggregate behavior, the experiment seems to confirm the qualitative predictions of the evolutionary model under structural changes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C9, E3. |
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