Contributions published at Banking (Steven Ongena)

This paper studies loan conditions when firms switch banks. Recent theoretical work on bank–firm relationships motivates our matching models. The dynamic cycle of the loan rate that we uncover is as follows: a loan granted by a new (outside) bank carries a loan rate that is significantly lower than the rates on comparable new loans from the firm's current (inside) banks. The new bank initially decreases the loan rate further but eventually ratchets it up sharply. Other loan conditions follow a similar economically relevant pattern. This bank strategy is consistent with the existence of hold-up costs in bank–firm relationships.

Household borrowing in a foreign currency is a widespread phenomenon in Austria. Thirteen percent of Austrian households report their housing loan to be denominated in foreign currency, mostly Swiss franc. Yet, despite its importance, peculiar character, and acute policy concerns, we know little about the attitudes and characteristics of the households involved in this type of carry trade. We analyze a uniquely detailed financial wealth survey of 2556 Austrian households to sketch a comprehensive profile of the attitudes and characteristics of the households involved. We employ both univariate tests and multivariate multinomial logit models. The survey data suggest that risk seeking, affluent, and married households are more likely to take a housing loan in a foreign currency. Financially literate or high-income households are more likely to take a housing loan in general. These findings partially assuage policy concerns about household default risk on foreign-currency housing loans or household retirement security.

The paper examines the relationship between competition and economic growth, in the theoretical framework described by endogenous growth models, but with a specific interest in the policy implications. In this perspective, the key issue in the debate can be presented as follows: do competition policies always create the best conditions for promoting innovation and growth? Or do they also produce some disincentives for the investment decisions in R&D, such to limit the development of industries with higher innovation? In order to answer these questions, the paper presents a survey of the theoretical literature on competition and growth and it discusses the main models of endogenous growth, both the ones based on horizontal innovation, and the ones based on vertical innovation. In particular, specific attention is paid to the most recent models of Schumpeterian growth, which show the existence of a non-linear relationship between competition and growth, by considering either the initial degree of competition or the distance from the technological frontier. Finally, the review of the previous models of endogenous growth allows drawing some conclusions about further and possible developments of research on the relation between product market competition and economic growth.

The recent credit crisis and the increased internationalization of the European banks have given the debate about the role of national regulators a renewed urgency. We therefore investigate the determinants of bondholders’ abnormal returns for both domestic and cross-border bank merger announcements that involve European acquirers for the period 1998–2002. We find that bondholders’ abnormal returns are higher for Domestic Mergers than cross-border mergers, in direct contrast to evidence from equity prices where no difference is found. Further investigations in which we control for the changes in market power for example suggest this result may be indicative of investors perceiving Domestic Mergers as increasing the probability of a government bailout in case of distress. Banks’ bondholders also experience higher abnormal returns when the country of the partner bank has stricter rules in relation to forbearance of prudential regulations than the own country, and when functional diversification between lending and fee/trading activities increases.

While the positive growth effects of financial integration are extensively documented, little is known of its impact on small and young firms. This paper aims to fill this void relying on a panel of 60,000 firm-year observations on listed and unlisted companies in Eastern European economies to assess the differential impact of foreign bank lending on firm growth and financing. Foreign lending stimulates growth in firm sales, assets, and use of financial debt even though the effect is dampened for small firms. More strikingly, young firms benefit most from foreign bank presence, while businesses connected to domestic banks or to the government suffer. Overall, our findings suggest that foreign banks can help to mitigate connected-lending problems and to improve capital allocation.

We investigate how bank organization shapes banking competition. We show that a bank's geographical lending reach and loan pricing strategy is determined by its own and its rivals’ organizational structure. We estimate the impact of organization on the geographical reach and loan pricing of a large bank. We find that the reach of the bank is smaller when rival banks are large and hierarchically organized, have superior communication technology, have a narrower span of organization, and are closer to a decision unit with lending authority. Rival banks’ size and the number of layers to a decision unit soften spatial pricing.

This book provides a compendium to the empirical work investigating the hypotheses generated by recent banking theory. Since the publication of the The Microeconomics of Banking by Xavier Freixas and Jean Charles Rochet, work in empirical banking has further blossomed, not only in sheer volume but also in the variety of questions being tackled, datasets becoming available, and methodologies being introduced. This book follows the structure in Freixas and Rochet’s book and arranges the relevant methodologies, applications, and results according to each of their original chapters in order to have a coherent synthesis between available theory and supporting empirics. Each chapter contains a modest introduction (where possible and appropriate), a concise methodology section with one or more relevant methodologies, and several illustrative applications. In a “muscular” results section the authors summarize the main robust and seminal findings in the literature that are in the text, and provide the details of many other studies in figures and tables.

Recently, mezzanine financing has been growing rather dramatically in Europe. We describe the characteristics of European mezzanine, the developments of the UK and Continental European mezzanine markets and the various financial instruments that are traded in the European market. We further study in detail a comprehensive dataset of recent European mezzanine deals, and analyse the determinants of the mezzanine credit spread on these deals employing a credit spread model recently used by Angbazo et al. (1998). We find that credit spreads on European mezzanine loans are lower for shorter maturity, term or bridge loans. Credit spreads further react sluggishly to corporate bond yields but do not react to their syndication.

How do banks react to increased competition? Recent banking theory significantly disagrees regarding the impact of competition on bank orientation-i.e., the choice of relationship-based versus transactional banking. We empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch orientation. We employ a unique data set containing detailed information on bank-firm relationships. We find that bank branches facing stiff local competition engage considerably more in relationship-based lending. Our results illustrate that competition and relationships are not necessarily inimical.

We study the decision an entrepreneur faces in financing multiple projects and show that relationship financing will arise endogenously in an environment where strategic defaults are likely, even when firms have access to arm's-length financing. Relationship financing allows an entrepreneur to build a private reputation for repayment that reduces the cost of financing. However, in an environment where the risk of strategic default is low, the benefits from reputation building are outweighed by holdup rents extractable by the incumbent lender. Entrepreneurs then choose to finance projects from single or multiple, arm's-length lenders. We relate these findings to studies that positively associate accounting standards, creditor rights, and legal enforcement with economic growth.

We estimate the impact of bank merger announcements on borrowers' stock prices for publicly traded Norwegian firms. Borrowers of target banks lose about 0.8% in equity value, while borrowers of acquiring banks earn positive abnormal returns, suggesting that borrower welfare is influenced by a strategic focus favoring acquiring borrowers. Bank mergers lead to higher relationship exit rates among borrowers of target banks. Larger merger-induced increases in relationship termination rates are associated with less negative abnormal returns, suggesting that firms with low switching costs switch banks, while similar firms with high switching costs are locked into their current relationship

We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.

We review how technological advances and changes in regulation may shape the (future) geographical scope of banking. We first review how both physical distance and the presence of borders currently affect bank lending conditions (loan pricing and credit availability) and market presence (branching and servicing). Next we discuss how technology and regulation have altered this impact and analyse the current state of the European banking sector. We discuss both theoretical contributions and empirical work and highlight open questions along the way. We draw three main lessons from the current theoretical and empirical literature: (i) bank lending to small businesses in Europe may be characterized both by (local) spatial pricing and resilient (regional and/or national) market segmentation; (ii) because of informational asymmetries in the retail market, bank mergers and acquisitions seem the optimal route of entering another market, long before cross-border servicing or direct entry are economically feasible; and (iii) current technological and regulatory developments may, to a large extent, remain impotent in further dismantling the various residual but mutually reinforcing frictions in the retail banking markets in Europe. We conclude the paper by offering pertinent policy recommendations based on these three lessons.

We model two dimensions of bank globalization – bank nationality (a bank from the firm’s host nation, its home nation, or a third nation) and bank reach (a global, regional, or local bank) using a two-stage nested multinomial logit model. Our data set includes over 2000 foreign affiliates of multinational corporations operating in 20 European nations and over 250 banks that serve them. We find that these firms frequently use host nation banks for cash management services, and that bank reach may be strongly influenced by this choice of bank nationality. Our results suggest limits to the degree of future bank globalization.

We use the near-collapse of the Norwegian banking system during the period 1988–1991 to measure the impact of bank distress announcements on the stock prices of firms maintaining a relationship with a distressed bank. Although banks experienced large and permanent downward revisions in their equity value during the event period, firms maintaining relationships with these banks faced only small and temporary changes, on average, in stock price. Firms with access to unused liquid bank funds and firms that issued equity just prior to the crisis experience relatively high abnormal returns. Overall, the aggregate impact of bank distress appears small.

This paper reviews how long-term relationships between firms and banks shape the structure and integration of banking markets worldwide. Bank relationships arise to span informational asymmetries that are endemic in financial markets. Firm-bank relationships not only entail specific benefits and costs for both the engaged firms and banks, but also directly affect the structure of banking markets. In particular, the sunk cost of screening and monitoring activities and the 'informational capital' collected by the incumbent banks may act as a barrier to entry. The intensity of the existing firm-bank relationships will determine the height of this barrier and shape the structure of international banking markets. For example, in Scandinavia where firms maintain few and strong relationships, foreign banks may only be able to enter successfully through mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, Southern European firms maintain many bank relationships. Therefore, banks may consider entering Southern European banking markets through direct investment.

We analyze the duration of bank relationships using a unique panel data set of listed firms and their banks from the bank-dominated Norwegian market. We find that firms are more likely to leave a bank as the relationship matures. Small, profitable, and highly leveraged firms maintain shorter bank relationships, as do firms with multiple bank relationships. These findings are robust to censoring, alternate specifications for the distribution of relationship duration, and other control variables relevant to the Norwegian market. Overall, our results cast doubt on theories suggesting that firms become locked into bank relationships.

This paper examines how bank relationships affect firm performance. An empirical implication of recent theoretical models is that firms maintaining multiple bank relationships are less profitable than their single-bank peers. We investigate this empirical implication using a data set containing virtually all Norwegian publicly listed firms for the period 1979-1995. We find a robust and economically relevant negative two-way correspondence between the number of relationships and sales profitability. We also find that firms replacing a single relationship are on average smaller and younger than those firms choosing not to replace a single relationship.

We investigate the determinants of multiple-bank relationships using a new data set comprising 1079 firms across 20 European countries. We document large cross-country variation in the average number of bank relationships per firm, uncovering a richness in European financial systems that extends beyond the standard description of being "bank-dominated". After controlling for a variety of firm-specific characteristics, we find that firms maintain more bank relationships, on average, in countries with inefficient judicial systems and poor enforcement of creditor rights. Firms also maintain more relationships in countries with unconcentrated but stable banking systems and active public bond markets.

The paper reviews contributions in the literature, which lend theoretical and empirical credibility to the idea that the banking relationship is valuable and important for the firm. Banks offer a lending relationship as the solution to the firm's ongoing credit needs. Bank default disrupts this relationship. Hence risk in the banking sector influences the value of the relationship, the cost of corporate finance, and the level and growth of real activity. As bank default is often the result of fraud and internal irregularities, it is hard to predict. Bank default affects the economy through a number of different channels. The loss of the relationship, benefit for the firm is an important route through which the health of the banking sector influences real activity.