Florian Schneider, Martin Schonger, An experimental test of the Anscombe-Aumann Monotonicity axiom, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 207, 2017. (Working Paper)
Most models of ambiguity aversion satisfy Anscombe-Aumann’s Monotonicity axiom. Monotonicity imposes separability of preferences across events that occur with unknown probability. We construct a test of Monotonicity by modifying the Allais paradox to a setting with both subjective and objective uncertainty. Two experimental studies are conducted: while study 1 uses U.S. online workers and a natural source of ambiguity, study 2 employs European students and an Ellsberg urn. In both studies, modal behavior violates Monotonicity in a specific, intuitive way. Overall, our data suggest that violations of Monotonicity are as prevalent as violations of von Neumann-Morgenstern’s Independence axiom. |
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Dragan Ilić, Sonja Pisarov, Peter S Schmidt, Preaching water but drinking wine? Relative performance evaluation in international banking, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 208, 2016. (Working Paper)
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is, at least on paper, enjoying widespread popularity in determining the level of executive compensation. Yet existing empirical evidence of RPE is decidedly mixed. Two principal explanations are held responsible for this discord. A constructional challenge arises from intricacies of identifying the correct peers. And on a simpler note, corporate commitments to RPE could be mere exercises in empty rhetoric. We address both issues and test the use of RPE in a new sample of large international non-U.S. banks. Taken as a whole, the banks in our sample show moderate evidence consistent with RPE. We report stronger evidence once we investigate the subsample of banks that disclose the use of peers in their compensation schemes. This finding lends support to the credibility and thus informational value of RPE commitments. Digging deeper, we conclude that RPE usage is driven by firm size and growth options. |
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Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen, Tobias Gesche, Persistent bias in advice-giving, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 228, 2017. (Working Paper)
We show that a one-off incentive to bias advice has persistent effects. In an experiment, advisers were paid a bonus to recommend a lottery which only risk-seeking individuals should choose to a less informed client. Afterwards, they had to choose for themselves and make a second recommendation to another client, without any bonus. These advisers choose the risky lottery and recommend it a second time up to six times more often than advisers in a control group who were never offered a bonus. These results are consistent with a theory we present which is based on advisers' image concerns of appearing incorruptible. |
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Alain Cohn, Michel Maréchal, Frédéric-Guillaume Schneider, Roberto A. Weber, Frequent job changes can signal poor work attitude and reduce employability, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 210, 2019. (Working Paper)
We study whether employment history provides information about a worker’s “work attitude,” i.e., the tendency to act cooperatively and reliably in the workplace. We conjecture that, holding all else equal, frequent job changes can indicate poor work attitude and that this information is transmitted through employment histories. We find support for this hypothesis across three studies that employ complementary lab, field, and survey experiments, as well as in labor market panel data. First, a tightly controlled laboratory labor market experiment demonstrates that prior employment information allows employers to screen for reliable and cooperative workers and that these workers obtain better employment outcomes. Second, we conduct a field experiment that varies the frequency of job changes in applicants’ resumes and find that those with fewer job changes receive substantially more callbacks from prospective employers. Third, a survey experiment with Human Resources professionals confirms that the resume manipulations in the field study create different perceptions of work attitude and that these largely account for the callback differences. Finally, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesized relationships in empirical labor market data. Our work highlights the potential importance of job history as a signal of work attitude in labor markets, and points to a potential cost of frequent job changes. |
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Alexey Kushnir, Liu Shuo, On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: the case of non-linear utilities, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 212, 2015. (Working Paper)
We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the average single-crossing property and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative externalities, environmental mechanism design, and public good provision. |
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Rafael Lalive, Armin Schmutzler, Christine Zulehner, Auctions vs negotiations in public procurement: which works better?, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 209, 2015. (Working Paper)
Public agencies mainly rely on two modes to procure goods and services: auctions and direct negotiations. We study a 1994 policy change in Germany that introduced the possibility to procure rail services in auctions as well as in direct negotiations with the incumbent. We analyze the effect of the procurement mode on service frequency and procurement price. Our analysis relies on self-collected data on the frequency of rail service on about 500 rail lines. We first develop a theoretical framework to study an agency’s decision on the procurement mode. We then use this framework to guide our empirical analysis on rail service, procurement price, and choice of procurement mode. Results indicate that, compared with negotiations, auctions improve service levels and reduce prices. As a result, surplus on auctioned lines increased by about 30%. Interestingly, surplus would also have increased by 16% on negotiated lines had auctions been used. We argue that the predominance of non-competitive modes reflects (actual or perceived) administrative costs of carrying out auctions. |
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Janina Nemitz, The effect of all-day primary school programs on maternal labor supply, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 213, 2015. (Working Paper)
This study analyzes the effect of all-day (AD) primary school programs on maternal labor supply. To account for AD school selectivity and selection into AD primary school programs I estimate bivariate probit models. To identify these models I exploit variation in the allocation of investments to AD primary schools across time and counties. This variation results from the public investment program "Future Education and Care" (IZBB) which was introduced by the German federal government in 2003. My results indicate for mothers with primary school-aged children in Germany (excluding Bavaria) a significantly positive effect of AD primary school programs on labor supply at the extensive margin. On average, mothers who make use of AD primary school programs are 26 ppts more likely to be employed than mothers who do not make use of these programs. This large effect is robust to alternative specifications and estimation methods and mainly concentrated in states with AD primary school student shares of up to 20%. On the contrary, there is no evidence for an impact of these programs on maternal labor supply at the intensive margin (full-time vs. part-time). |
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Florian Schaffner, Predicting US bank failures with internet search volume data, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 214, 2015. (Working Paper)
This study investigates how well weekly Google search volumes track and predict bank failures in the United States between 2007 and 2012, contributing to the expanding literature that exploits internet data for the prediction of events. Different duration models with time-varying covariates are estimated. Higher Google search volumes go hand in hand with higher failure rates, and the coefficients for the Google volume growth index are highly significant. However, Google’s predictive power quickly dissipates for future failure rates. |
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Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon H Hanson, Brendan Price, Import competition and the great U.S. employment sag of the 2000s, In: UBS Center Working Paper Series, No. 13, 2015. (Working Paper)
Even before the Great Recession, U.S. employment growth was unimpressive. Between 2000 and 2007, the economy gave back the considerable employment gains achieved during the 1990s, with a historic contraction in manufacturing employment being a prime contributor to the slump. We estimate that import competition from China, which surged after 2000, was a major force behind both recent reductions in U.S. manufacturing employment and—through input-output linkages and other general equilibrium channels—weak overall U.S. job growth. Our central estimates suggest job losses from rising Chinese import competition over 1999 through 2011 in the range of 2.0 to 2.4 million. |
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Gregory S. Crawford, Robin S Lee, Michael D Whinston, Ali Yurukoglu, The welfare effects of vertical integration in multichannel television markets, In: NBER Working Paper Series, No. 21832, 2015. (Working Paper)
We investigate the welfare effects of vertical integration of regional sports networks (RSNs) with programming distributors in U.S. multichannel television markets. Vertical integration can enhance efficiency by reducing double marginalization and increasing carriage of channels, but can also harm welfare due to foreclosure and raising rivals' costs incentives. We estimate a structural model of viewership, subscription, distributor pricing, and affiliate fee bargaining using a rich dataset on the U.S. cable and satellite television industry (2000-2010). We use these estimates to analyze the impact of simulated vertical mergers and de-mergers of RSNs on competition and welfare, and examine the efficacy of regulatory policies introduced by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to address competition concerns in this industry. |
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Björn Bartling, Tobias Gesche, Nick Netzer, Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 225, 2016. (Working Paper)
This paper studies the impact of the presence of human subjects in the role of a seller on bidding in experimental second-price auctions. Overbidding is a robust finding in second- price auctions, and spite among bidders has been advanced as an explanation. If spite extends to the seller, then the absence of human sellers who receive the auction revenue may bias upwards the bidding behavior in existing experimental auctions. We derive the equilibrium bidding function in a model where bidders have preferences regarding both, the payoffs of other bidders and the seller’s revenue. Overbidding is optimal when buyers are spiteful only towards other buyers. However, optimal bids are lower and potentially even truthful when spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human subjects in the roles of the seller and competing bidders. We do not detect a systematic effect of the presence of a human seller on overbidding. We conclude that overbidding is not an artefact of the standard experimental implementation of second-price auctions in which human sellers are absent. |
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Alain Cohn, Michel Maréchal, Priming in economics, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 226, 2016. (Working Paper)
Conceptual priming has become an increasingly popular tool in economics. Here, we review the literature that uses priming in incentivized experiments to study economic questions. We mainly focus on the role of social identity, culture, and norms in shaping preferences and behavior. We also discuss recently raised objections to priming research and conclude with promising avenues for future research. |
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Michel Maréchal, Christian Thöni, Hidden persuaders: do small gifts lubricate business negotiations?, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 227, 2018. (Working Paper)
Gift-giving customs are ubiquitous in social, political, and business life. Legal regulation and industry guidelines for gifts are often based on the assumption that large gifts potentially influence behavior and create conflicts of interest, but small gifts do not. However, scientific evidence on the impact of small gifts on business relationships is scarce. We conducted a natural field experiment in collaboration with sales agents of a multinational consumer products company to study the influence of small gifts on the outcome of business negotiations. We find that small gifts matter. On average, sales representatives generate more than twice as much revenue when they distribute a small gift at the onset of their negotiations. However, we also find that small gifts tend to be counterproductive when purchasing and sales agents meet for the first time, suggesting that the nature of the business relationship crucially affects the profitability of gifts. |
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Joseph P Romano, Michael Wolf, Multiple testing of one-sided hypotheses: combining Bonferroni and the bootstrap, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 254, 2017. (Working Paper)
In many multiple testing problems, the individual null hypotheses (i) concern univariate parameters and (ii) are one-sided. In such problems, power gains can be obtained for bootstrap multiple testing procedures in scenarios where some of the parameters are 'deep in the null' by making certain adjustments to the null distribution under which to resample. In this paper, we compare a Bonferroni adjustment that is based on finite-sample considerations with certain 'asymptotic' adjustments previously suggested in the literature. |
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Tobias Gesche, De-biasing strategic communication, In: Working paper series / Department of Economics, No. 216, 2021. (Working Paper)
This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same time, also to more biased messages. This benefits rational receivers but exerts a negative externality from them on naive or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of the information structure under which this effect manifests and show that whenever it does, full disclosure is socially inefficient. These results hold independently of the degree of the receivers’ risk-aversion and for an arbitrary precision of the disclosure statement. |
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Javier Cravino, Andrei A Levchenko, The distributional consequences of large devaluations, In: UBS Center Working Paper Series, No. 15, 2016. (Working Paper)
We study the differential impact of large exchange rate devaluations on the cost of living at different points on the income distribution. Across product categories, the poor have relatively high expenditure shares in tradeable products. Within tradeable product categories, the poor consume lower-priced varieties. Changes in the relative price of tradeables and the relative prices of lower-priced varieties following a devaluation will affect the cost of the consumption basket of the low-income households relative that of the high-income households. We quantify these effects following the 1994 Mexican peso devaluation and show that their distributional consequences can be large. In the two years that follow the devaluation, the cost of the consumption basket of those in the bottom decile of the income distribution rose between 1.46 and 1.6 times more than the cost of the consumption basket for the top income decile. |
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Konstantin Beck, Lukas Kauer, Beschreibung der Berechnung einer Einheitsprämie gemäss der Initiative für eine öffentliche Krankenkasse, In: Schriften des CSS-Instituts für empirische Gesundheitsökonomie, No. 2014, 2014. (Working Paper)
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Konstantin Beck, Empirische Fakten zur Fiktion kantonaler Reserven in der Sozialen Krankenversicherung, In: Schriften des CSS-Instituts für empirische Gesundheitsökonomie, No. 969/2013, 2013. (Working Paper)
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Viktor von Wyl, Konstantin Beck, Sind junge Risiken auch gute Risiken? - Eine kritische Betrachtung der Stellung der Jugendlichen in der obligatorischen Grundversicherung, In: Schriften des CSS Instituts für empirische Gesundheitsökonomie, No. 2012, 2012. (Working Paper)
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Konstantin Beck, Les réserves transférables sont-elles une alternative au calcul des réserves par canton? - Avantages et inconvénients de réserves transférables dans l'assurance obligatoire des soins, In: Contribution du CSS Institut de recherche empirique en économie de la santé, No. 2009, 2009. (Working Paper)
Le document met la discussion des réserves transférables en relation avec l'exigence politique que les réserves légales minimales soient fixées par canton. A ce propos, il montre l'évolution de la régulation des réserves des 13 dernières années et met en évidence l'augmentation du risque qui y est lié et que l'OFSP a pris en compte de manière quelque peu négligente. Ce document prouve aussi pourquoi l'exigence de réserves cantonales est en contradiction la plus fondamentale avec l'actuariat, base des affaires d'assurance. La discussion des avantages et des inconvénients des réserves transférables fait ressortir que celles-ci posent également de nombreuses questions et troubleraient encore davantage le marché déjà fortement ébranlé. Mais afin de satisfaire tout de même au mandat du conseil d'administration, un modèle de transférabilité interne à la caisse est développé à l'alinéa 4.2.6. et une autre idée est esquissée à l'alinéa 5. Tous deux pourraient contribuer à désamorcer la discussion en matière de réserves
cantonales. |
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