Contributions in Merlin

The structure of marriage and child-rearing in U.S. households has undergone two marked shifts in the last three decades: a steep decline in the prevalence of marriage among young adults, and a sharp rise in the fraction of children born to unmarried mothers or living in single-headed households. A potential contributor to both phenomena is the declining labor-market opportunities faced by males, which make them less valuable as marital partners. We exploit large scale, plausibly exogenous labor-demand shocks stemming from rising international manufacturing competition to test how shifts in the supply of young ‘marriageable’ males affect marriage, fertility and children's living circumstances. Trade shocks to manufacturing industries have differentially negative impacts on the labor market prospects of men and degrade their marriage-market value along multiple dimensions: diminishing their relative earnings—particularly at the lower segment of the distribution—reducing their physical availability in trade-impacted labor markets, and increasing their participation in risky and damaging behaviors. As predicted by a simple model of marital decision-making under uncertainty, we document that adverse shocks to the supply of `marriageable' men reduce the prevalence of marriage and lower fertility but raise the fraction of children born to young and unwed mothers and living in in poor single-parent households. The falling marriage-market value of young men appears to be a quantitatively important contributor to the rising rate of out-of-wedlock childbearing and single-headed childrearing in the United States.

These days, it is common practice to base inference about the coefficients in a hetoskedastic linear model on the ordinary least squares estimator in conjunction with using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Even when the true form of heteroskedasticity is unknown, heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors can also used to base valid inference on a weighted least squares estimator and using such an estimator can provide large gains in efficiency over the ordinary least squares estimator. However, intervals based on asymptotic approximations with plug-in standard errors often have coverage that is below the nominal level, especially for small sample sizes. Similarly, tests can have null rejection probabilities that are above the nominal level. In this paper, it is shown that under unknown hereroskedasticy, a bootstrap approximation to the sampling distribution of the weighted least squares estimator is valid, which allows for inference with improved finite-sample properties. For testing linear constraints, permutations tests are proposed which are exact when the error distribution is symmetric and is asymptotically valid otherwise. Another concern that has discouraged the use of weighting is that the weighted least squares estimator may be less efficient than the ordinary least squares estimator when the model used to estimate the unknown form of the heteroskedasticity is misspecified. To address this problem, a new estimator is proposed that is asymptotically at least as efficient as both the ordinary and the weighted least squares estimator. Simulation studies demonstrate the attractive finite-sample properties of this new estimator as well as the improvements in performance realized by bootstrap confidence intervals.

We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherwise standard targeting framework can explain several recent key issues from the advertising industry, such as consumer-side information overload or the increased usage of ad blocking tools.

Different social contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process. We use a within-subjects design and measure distributional preferences in resource allocation tasks with role certainty, role uncertainty, decomposed games, and matrix games. Results show that, at the aggregate level, role uncertainty and decomposed games lead to higher degrees of prosociality when compared to role certainty. At the individual level, we observe considerable differences in behavior across the social contexts, indicating that the majority of people are sensitive to these different social settings but respond in different ways.

There has been a recent interest in reporting p-values adjusted for resampling-based stepdown multiple testing procedures proposed in Romano and Wolf (2005a,b). The original papers only describe how to carry out multiple testing at a fixed significance level. Computing adjusted p-values instead in an efficient manner is not entirely trivial. Therefore, this paper fills an apparent gap by detailing such an algorithm.

Many literatures investigate the causal impact of income on economic outcomes, for example in the context of intergenerational transmission or well-being and health. Some studies have proposed to use employer wage differentials and in particular industry affiliation as an instrument for income. We demonstrate that industry affiliation is correlated with fixed individual characteristics, specifically parents' education and own height, conditional on the covariates typically controlled for in these studies. These results suggest that there is selection into industries based on unobservables. As a result the exclusion restriction in many IV studies of this type is likely violated.

This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor will step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. We study experimentally whether people employ the argument "if I don’t do it, someone else will" to justify taking a narrowly self-interested action. Our data reveal a clear pattern. Subjects do not employ the "replacement excuse" if a social norm exists that classifies the selfish action as immoral. But if no social norm exists, subjects are more inclined to take a selfish action in situations where another subject can otherwise take it. By demonstrating the importance of social norms of moral behavior for limiting the power of the replacement excuse, our paper informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals.

Do wealth shocks affect the health of the elderly in developed countries? The economic literature is skeptical about such effects which have so far only been found for poor retirees in poor countries. In this paper I show that wealth shocks also matter for the health of wealthy retirees in the US. I exploit the booms and busts in the US stock market as a natural experiment that generated considerable gains and losses in the wealth of stock-holding retirees.Using data from the Health and Retirement Study I construct wealth shocks as the interaction of stock holdings with stock market changes. These constructed wealth shocks are highly predictive of changes in reported wealth. And they strongly affect health outcomes. A 10% wealth shock leads to an improvement of 2-3% of a standard deviation in physical health, mental health and survival rates. Effects are heterogeneous across physical health conditions, with most pronounced effects for the incidence of high blood pressure, smaller effects for heart problems and no effects for arthritis, diabetes, lung diseases and cancer. The comparison with the cross-sectional relationship of wealth and health suggests that the estimated effects of wealth shocks are larger than the long-run wealth elasticity of health.

Das Interesse an der Verteilung von Einkommen und Vermögen ist in jüngster Zeit wieder neu entbrannt. Nicht zuletzt, weil nach vielen Jahren der Stabilität die Ungleichheit in vielen Ländern wieder zunimmt. Auch in der Schweiz geniesst die Frage nach der Einkommens- und Vermögensverteilung in der öffentlichen und politischen Diskussion grosse Aufmerksamkeit. Die Analyse über die letzten 100 Jahre zeigt, dass im Ländervergleich das Niveau der Einkommen und Löhne in der Schweiz hoch ist, die Ungleichheit zwischen Arm und Reich wenig stark ausgeprägt ist und sich die Öffnung der Einkommensschere über die Zeit in engen Grenzen hält. Die Ausnahme bilden die Superreichen, deren Anteile in jüngster Zeit deutlich zugenommen haben. Die relativ egalitäre Primärverteilung der Einkommen und Löhne und die föderale Struktur mit ihrem Steuerwettbewerb führen dazu, dass Bedarf und Ausmass der Umverteilung relativ gering ausfallen. Als Kehrseite der Medaille ist die hohe Stabilität wohl ein Grund dafür, dass die Einkommensmobilität im internationalen Vergleich gering ausfällt. Dafür fällt das Durchschnittsniveau der Einkommen rekordhoch aus. Die gefundenen Aussagen gelten verstärkt für die Vermögen. Diese reagieren viel träger auf Einzelereignisse, weil sie über Jahrzehnte aufgebaut werden. Die anhaltende politische Stabilität und die berechenbare Wirtschaftspolitik haben der Schweiz neben sehr hohen Durchschnittsvermögen eine sehr persistente Vermögensverteilung beschert, womit sie unter Industrieländern eine grosse Ausnahme darstellt. Entsprechend ist die Vermögenskonzentration im internationalen Vergleich sehr hoch. Das Ausmass relativiert sich aber, wenn wir die für die Schweiz wichtigen Pensionskassenvermögen miteinbeziehen.

Throughout human history, informal sanctions by peers were ubiquitous and played a key role in the enforcement of social norms and the provision of public goods. However, a considerable body of experimental evidence suggests that informal peer sanctions cause large collateral damage and efficiency costs. This raises the question whether peer sanctioning systems exist that avoid these costs and whether other, more centralized, punishment systems are superior and will be preferred by the people. Here, we show that welfare-enhancing peer sanctioning without much need for costly punishment emerges quickly if we introduce two relevant features of social life into the experiment: (i) subjects can migrate across groups with different sanctioning institutions and (ii) they have the chance to achieve consensus about normatively appropriate behavior. The exogenous removal of the norm consensus opportunity reduces the efficiency of peer punishment and renders centralized sanctioning by an elected judge the dominant institution. However, if given the choice, subjects universally reject peer sanctioning without a norm consensus opportunity – an institution that has hitherto dominated research in this field – in favor of peer sanctioning with a norm consensus opportunity or an equally efficient institution with centralized punishment by an elected judge. Migration opportunities and normative consensus building are key to the quick emergence of an efficient culture of universal cooperation because the more prosocial subjects populate the two efficient institutions first, elect prosocial judges (if institutionally possible), and immediately establish a social norm of high cooperation. This norm appears to guide subjects’ cooperation and punishment choices, including the virtually complete removal of antisocial punishment when judges make the sanctioning decision.