Enrico De Giorgi, Reward-Risk Portfolio Selection and Stochastic Dominance, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 121, 2004. (Working Paper)
The portfolio selection problem is traditionally modelled by two different approaches. The first one is based on an axiomatic model of risk-averse preferences, where decision makers are assumed to possess an expected utility function. The second approach, first proposed by Markowitz (1952), reduces the portfolio choice to a set of two criteria, reward and risk. Usually the reward-risk model is not consistent with the first approach, even when the decision is independent from the specific form of the risk-averse expected utility function. In this paper we generalize the reward-risk model for portfolio selection. We define reward measures and risk measures by giving a set of properties these measures should satisfy. One of these properties will be the consistency with second order stochastic dominance, to obtain a link with the expected utility portfolio selection. We characterize reward and risk measures and we discuss the implication for portfolio selection. |
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Max Gruetter, Rafael Lalive, The Importance of Firms in Wage Determination, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 207, 2004. (Working Paper)
Firms are central to many theories of the labor market. However, the actual degree to which firms shape the structure of wages is still not well understood. This paper investigates (i) the importance of firms in explaining wage differences across individuals and industries, and (ii) how the nature of interfirm mobility - job-to-job vs. job-unemployment-job - affects the relative importance of firms and workers in wage determination. Results indicate that (i) firms are much more important in explaining the variance of average wages across industries rather than across individuals, and (ii) using job-to-job transitions to identify the firm's contribution to the wage rate reduces the importance of firm wage policies in explaining wage differences by as much as 50%. |
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Bruno Frey, Alois Stutzer, The Role of Direct Democracy and Federalism in Local Power, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 209, 2004. (Working Paper)
"Alienation to politics weakens political competition and can undermine the acceptance and legitimacy of democracy as a political system. Governance andnrepresentation problems at the local level cause part of citizens lack of power andnpolitical alienation. Citizens have local power if they can process so that its outcomes are closer to their preferences and if they feel to be effective in the political sphere. In order to increase citizens local power, we emphasize the role of institutions of local governance. Local democratic governance is concerned about the relationship between citizens and local governmentninstitutions, political representatives and officials. This relationship is fundamentally shaped by the federal structure of a nations government and by the scope and depth of citizens participation possibilities in the political process. " |
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Bruno Frey, Simon Luechinger, Alois Stutzer, Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the Costs of Terrorism, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 205, 2004. (Working Paper)
"The trends and consequences of terrorist activities are often captured by counting the number of incidents and casualties. More recently, the effects of terrorist acts on various aspects of the economy have been analyzed. These costs are surveyed and put in perspective. As economic consequences are only a part of the overall costsnof terrorism, possible approaches for estimating the utility losses of the people affected are discussed. Results using the life satisfaction approach, in which individual utility is approximated by self-reported subjective well-being, suggest that people's utility lossesnmay far exceed the purely economic consequences." |
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Alois Stutzer, Bruno Frey, Does Marriage Make People Happy, Or Do Happy People Get Married, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 143, 2004. (Working Paper)
This paper analyzes the causal relationships between marriage and subjective well-being in a longitudinal data set spanning 17 years. We find evidence that more happy singles opt more likely for marriage and that there are large differences in the benefits from marriage between couples. Potential, as well as actual, division of labor seems to contribute to spouses' well-being, especially for women and when there is a young family to raise. In contrast, large differences in the partners' educational level have a negative effect on experienced life satisfaction. |
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Dennis Gaertner, Endogenizing Private Information: Incentive Contracts under Learning By Doing, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 413, 2004. (Working Paper)
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on whether learning effects increase or decrease the principal’s uncertainty about agents’ costs of production. Hence, what drives the over- or under-exploitation of learning effects is whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). Furthermore, we show that if divergence in costs through learning effects is strong enough, learning effects will not be exploited at all, in a sense to be made precise. |
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Rafael Lalive, Jan C van Ours, Josef Zweimüller, How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 206, 2004. (Working Paper)
This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance-the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential benefit duration (PBD)-affect the duration of unemployment. To identify such an effect we exploit a policy change introduced in 1989 by the Austrian government, which affected various unemployed workers differently: a first group experienced an increase in RR; a second group experienced an extension of PBD; a third group experienced both a higher RR and a longer PBD; and a fourth group experienced no change in the policy parameters. We find that unemployed workers react to the disincentives by an increase in unemployment duration, and our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of job search theory. We use our parameter estimates to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to changes in the unemployment insurance system with unchanged behaviour and costs due to behavioural responses of unemployed workers. Our results indicate that costs due to behavioural responses are substantial. |
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Christian Ewerhart, The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Outcome of Alternating-Offers - Bargaining between Inequity-Averse Agents, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 203, 2004. (Working Paper)
The paper analyzes the infinite-horizon alternating-offers bargaining game between agents with inequity-averse preferences. Without prior investments,nthe model predicts a shift of the outcome towards equal division. Asymmetricninvestments affect the ex-post bargaining outcome, giving an advantage to the party that contributed more. Under suitable circumstances, this effectnmay significantly mitigate the hold-up problem. In fact, in a symmetric setup, if production is sufficiently profitable, and parties are sufficiently patient, then the first-best investment levels can be approximated without a con |
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Pavlo R Blavatskyy, Why qualifications at the Olympics?, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 204, 2004. (Working Paper)
"The optimal contest architecture for symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests isnshown to be generically the two-stage tournament (rather than the one-stage contest). In the first stage the contestants compete in several parallel divisions for the right to participate in the secondnstage. In the second stage the short-listed finalists compete for the prize. Given a sufficient number of contestants, the two-stage tournament is either strictly better or at least as good as the one-stage contest for maximizing an individuals effort, for maximizing the aggregate effort andnfor minimizing the standard deviation of effort. For maximizing an individuals effort it is generally optimal to have only two finalists in the second stage. For maximizing the aggregate effort or minimizing the standard deviation of effort the optimal number of finalists in the second stage depends on the discriminating power of the contest success function." |
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Markus Koenig, Peter Zweifel, Willingness-to-pay Against Dementia: Effects of Altruism Between Patients and Their Spouse Caregivers, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 411, 2004. (Working Paper)
Objectives - Preferences of both Alzheimer patients and their spouse caregivers are related to a willingness-to-pay (WTP) measure which is used to test for the presence of mutual (rather than the conventional one-way) altruism. Methods - Identical contingent valuation interviews were conducted in 2000 - 2002 for 126 Alzheimer patients and their caregiving spouses living in the Zurich metropolitan area (Switzerland). We elicit WTP three hypothetical treatments of the demented patient. The treatment Stabilization prevents the worsening of the disease, bringing dementia to a standstill. Cure restores patient health to its original level. In No burden, dementia takes its normal course while caregiver’s burden is reduced to its level before the disease. Results - Different characteristics of therapies are reflected in differences in WTP values. Accepting WTP values as expression of preferences, one finds that patients do not rank Cure higher than No burden; implying that their WTP is entirely altruistic. Caregiving spouses rank Cure before Burden, some 40 percent of their WTP reflecting an altruistic motive again. Discussion - The evidence suggests that WTP values are reliable measures of subjective preferences even in Alzheimer patients. Using this indicator, it is found that only caregivers have extra WTP for Cure, implying that curing dementia has value exclusively to them. |
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Patrick Leoni, A Learning Theory for the Harsanyi's Doctrine in Repeated Games, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 196, 2004. (Working Paper)
This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others' actions in repeated games, and identifies a set of sufficient conditions assuring that equilibrium actions converge to a Nash equilibrium.nPlayers have each an utility function over infinite histories continuous for the product topology. Nature' drawing after any history can depend on any past actions, or can be independent of them.nProvided that 1) every player maximizes her expected payoff against her own beliefs, 2) every player updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, 3) prior beliefs about both nature and other players' strategies have a grain of truth, and 4) beliefs about nature are independent of actions chosen during the game, we show that after some finite time the equilibrium outcome of the above game is arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium.nThose assumptions are shown to be tight. |
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Pierre Monnin, Are stock markets really like beauty contests? Empirical evidence of higher order belief's impact on asset prices, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 202, 2004. (Working Paper)
The goal of this paper is to assess, for the first time, the empirical impact of "Keynes’ beauty contest", or "higher order beliefs", on asset price volatility. The paper shows that heterogeneous expectations induce higher order beliefs and that heterogeneous expectation asset pricing models theoretically generate more volatility than rational expectation models. The paper also explains how, with some assumptions on the distribution of public and private information, a model with higher order beliefs can be empirically estimated. The model is then applied to annual data of the American stock market. The results show that a model with higher order beliefs generates a level of volatility in line with the price volatility observed on the market. |
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Patrick Leoni, Pietro Senesi, Existence and Global Attractivity of Stable Solutions in Neural Networks, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 198, 2004. (Working Paper)
The present paper shows that a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable solution to an autoregressive neural network model is the continuity and boundedness of the activation function of the hidden units in the multi layer perceptron (MLP). In addition, uniqueness of a stable solution is ensured by global lipschitzness and some conditions on the parameters of the system. In this case, the stable value is globally stable and convergence of the learning process occurs at exponential rate. |
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Christian Ewerhart, Nuno Cassola, Steen Ejerskov, Natacha Valla, Optimal Allotment Policy in Central Bank Open Market Operations, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 201, 2004. (Working Paper)
"This paper derives a central banks optimal liquidity supply towards a money market with an unrestricted lending facility. We show that when the effect ofnliquidity on market rates is not too small, and the monetary authority cares for both interest rates and liquidity conditions, then the optimal allotment policy may entail a discontinuous reaction to initial conditions. In particular, the model predicts a threshold level of liquidity below which the central banknwill not bail out the banking system. An estimation of the liquidity effect for the euro area suggests that the discontinuity might have contributed to the Eurosystems tight response to occurrences of underbidding during the period June 2000 through March 2004." |
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Alois Stutzer, Bruno Frey, Stress That Doesn't Pay: The Commuting Paradox, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 151, 2004. (Working Paper)
People spend more and more time commuting and often find it a burden.nAccording to economics, the burden of commuting is chosen when compensated eithernon the labor or on the housing market so that individuals' utility is equalized. However, inna direct test of this strong notion of equilibrium, we find that people with longerncommuting time report systematically lower subjective well-being. Additional empiricalnanalyses rule out institutional explanations of the empirical finding that commutersnsystematically incur losses. We discuss several possibilities of an extended model ofnhuman behavior able to explain this 'commuting paradox'. |
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Steffen Huck, Michael Kosfeld, The Dynamics of Neighbourhood Watch and Norm Enforcement, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 199, 2004. (Working Paper)
"We analyze the dynamics of neighbourhood watch programs in a local interaction framework. Agents can watch their neighbours' houses and thus deter burglars from breaking in.nAt the same time, agents also try to recruit their neighbours to join the neighbourhood watchnprogram. The probability of an agent joining the neighbourhood watch program depends on the success of the program, i.e., whether burglaries continue to occur. We show that the punishment of burglars plays a dual role in this context. On the one hand, punishmentndeters burglaries if the level of punishment is sufficiently high. On the other hand, it alsonaffects the probability of an agent joining the neighbourhood watch program. In particular,nwe show that if recruitment is harder when burglaries do not occur, a legal policy attemptingnto improve deterrence using more severe punishment is suboptimal. In a second part, we extend our model to the study of norm enforcement in public goods dilemmas and show that our results remain valid if agents can punish each other (instead of burglars) for not contributing to the public good. Our paper thus provides a first analysis of the evolution of ""altruistic punishment"" in large populations with local interaction." |
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Patrick Leoni, When Are Market Crashes Driven by Speculation?, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 197, 2004. (Working Paper)
A natural conjecture is that speculative trade disappears when individual beliefs become correct through learning. Sandroni in [22] gives a counterexample in an economy with sunspots. We generalizenSandroni's result by showing that the conjecture holds for economies with complete markets only. We consider a standard finite-horizon General Equilibrium model with complete markets, where uncertaintynis represented by fluctuations in individual endowments. Individual beliefs are formed through arbitrary learning processes, and become eventually correct. We show that along every path of events, equilibrium prices of traded assets converge to rational expectations for the sup-norm. We also give a set of sufficient conditions on beliefs andnaggregate endowment leading to market crashes, as in Sandroni [22].nWe show that such situations are generically continuous perturbations of rational expectations behaviors when beliefs satisfy a requirementnintroduced here. |
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Pavlo R Blavatskyy, Why the Olympics have three prizes and not just one, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 200, 2004. (Working Paper)
There are at least two reasons why multiple prizes can be optimal in symmetric imperfectly discriminating contests. First, the introduction of multiple prizes reduces the standard deviation of contestants' effort in asymmetric equilibria, when the majority of contestants actively participate in competition. Second, the introduction of multiple prizes may increase the aggregate (average) effort contributed in the contest. When more of a total prize fund is shifted away from the first prize, on the one hand, the active contestants obtain an incentive to reduce their individual effort, but, on the other hand, the number of active contestants may increase. Therefore, the aggregate (average) effort may increase when the number of active contestants in equilibrium increases. |
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Thomas Borek, Stefan Buehler, Armin Schmutzler, Mergers under Asymmetric Information Is there a Lemons Problem?, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 408, 2004. (Working Paper)
We analyze a Bayesian merger game under two-sided asymmetric information about firm types. We show that the standard prediction of the lemons market model–if any, only low-type firms are traded–is likely to be misleading: Merger returns, i.e. the difference between pre- and post-merger profits, are not necessarily higher for low-type firms. This has two implications. First, under very general conditions, equilibria exist where mergers take place, and there is no presumption that there is ineffciently low trade. Second, in these equilibria it is typically not the case that only low-type firms enter an agreement. |
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Bruno Frey, Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 187, 2004. (Working Paper)
"Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause great damage. Agency theorys insistence to link the compensation of mangers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals.nThey cannot be overcome by improving variable pay for performance as selfish extrinsicnmotivation is reinforced. Based on the common pool approach to the firm, institutions arenproposed, serving to raise intrinsically motivated corporate virtue. More importance is to benattributed to fixed pay and strengthening the legitimacy of authorities by procedural fairness, relational contracts and organizational citizenship behavior." |
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