Bruno Frey, Alois Stutzer, Happiness, Economy and Institutions, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 15, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
"A cross-regional econometric analysis is conducted suggesting that institutional factors in the form of direct democracy (via initiatives and referenda) and of federal structure (local autonomy) systematically and sizeably raise self-reported individual well-being. This positive effect can be attributed to political outcomes closer to voters preferences as well as to the procedural utility of political participation. Moreover, the results of ""standard"" microeconometric well-being functions previously published are supported. Unemployment among economic variables and bad health among demographic variables have a strongly depressing effect on happiness. Income only significantly raises happiness for higher income groups." |
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Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 10, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats. |
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Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Josef Zweimüller, Do Immigrants Displace Young Native Workers: The Austrian Experience, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 11, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
This paper studies the effect of increased immigration in Austria on the unemployment risk of young natives. Austria experienced a dramatic rise in the share of alien workers as a result of the breakdown of the former commu-nist regimes (especially from former Yugoslavia). We concentrate on unemployment entry of young male workers, who are supposed to compete most heavily with new immigrants. Our results indicate that the detrimental impact - if it exists at all - is only minor. This is irrespective of the analyzed proxy for competition: The share of foreign workers in an industry or in a region. |
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Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran, Does Money Illusion Matter?, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 12, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
"Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal or in real terms. To examine the behavioral impact of money illusion we studied the adjustment process of nominal prices after a fully anticipated negative nominal shock in an experimental setting with strategic complementarity. We show that seemingly innocuous differences in payoff presentation cause large behavioral differences. In particular, if the payoff information is presented to subjects in nominal terms, price stickiness and real effects are much more pronounced than when payoff information is presented in real terms. The driving force of differences in real outcomes is subjects expectation of higher nominal inertia in the nominal payoff condition. Due to strategic complementarity, these expectations induce subjects to adjust rather slowly to the shock." |
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Bruno Frey, Lorenz Goette, Does Pay Motivate Volunteers?, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 7, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
Volunteer work is an increasingly large, yet ill-understood sector of the economy. We show that monetary rewards undermine the intrinsic motivation of volunteers. A unique data set from Switzerland allows us to assess the effects of financial rewards on the effort put into volunteer work. There is a fairly standard pattern regarding the volunteers reaction e.g. to more labor market work hours. But we obtain the puzzling result that, when rewarded, volunteers work less. These findings are in line with a large literature in social psychology emphasizing that external rewards can undermine the intrinsic motivation for an activity. We show the implications for public policy towards volunteering. |
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Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Josef Zweimüller, Intra-firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 8, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
Personnel economics has put forward conflicting arguments concerning the impact of increased wage dispersion within a firm on the productivity of its workers. Besides giving more incentives, bigger wage differentials might also give rise to less co-operation and more politicking amongst workers resulting in worse outcomes. We try to shed light on these issues using panel data for Austrian firms. As indicators for firm performance we use standardised wages. For white-collar wages the following picture emerges: more dispersion leads to higher earnings up to some point where the relation changes its direction. For blue-collar wages we find a positive association between dispersion and standardised wages between firms, but no relation within firms over time. |
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Josef Zweimüller, Schumpeterian Entrepreneurs Meet Engel's Law: The Impact of Inequality on Innovation-Driven Growth, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 9, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
This paper analyzes the impact of inequality on growth when technical progress is driven by innovations and consumers have hierarchic preferences. Inequality has an impact on growth because it affects the structure and the dynamics of demand. Redistribution from very rich to very poor consumers is beneficial for growth. In general, the growth effect depends on the nature of redistribution. Due to a demand externality of R&D activities multiple equilibria are possible. |
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Ernst Fehr, Klaus M Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 4, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free-riders, stable cooperation is maintained although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior. |
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Markus Knell, Social Comparisons, Inequality, and Growth, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 5, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
Over the recent years one could repeatedly hear the claim that a rising concern for relative standing (in terms of consumption) was partly responsible for the decline in household savings and in growth that could be observed in some developed countries (particularly in the US) and that the rise in income inequality had further aggravated this process. In this paper we want to analyze under which conditions (concerning the importance of social comparisons for peoples' behavior and their choice of reference groups) this claim is valid. We show that an increase in a societies' concern for relative standing aggravates a negative impact of inequality on growth if two conditions are fulfilled: individuals have a higher concern for their present than for their future relative standing and individuals have a tendency to find their reference groups among people that are wealthier then they are themselves. Empirical data suggest that the negative impact of inequality on growth is stronger in highly developed economies. This is compatible with the explanation that is presented in this paper if individuals living in highly developed countries are more likely to have a high concern for relative standing. We will argue (using research on the cultural consequences of economic development) that this is a reasonable assumption to make. |
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Josef Falkinger, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 3, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
This paper presents an experimental examination of the Falkinger (1996) mechanism for overcoming the free-rider problem. The basic idea of the mechanism is that deviations from the mean contribution to the public good are taxed and subsidized. The mechanism has attractive properties because (i) it induces higher contributions to the public good and can implement an efficient level of contributions as a Nash equilibrium, (ii) the government budget is always balanced irrespective of the level of individual contributions, (iii) it is simple and policy makers need only little information to implement the mechanism. To examine the empirical properties of the mechanism we conducted a large series of experiments. It turns out that the introduction of the mechanism generates immediate and large efficiency gains. This result is robust throughout many different experimental settings. Moreover, in the presence of the mechanism the Nash equilibrium is a rather good predictor of behavior. |
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Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Josef Zweimüller, Firm Size Wage Differentials in Switzerland: Evidence from Job Changers, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 1, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
Using information on job changes and search behavior of workers and controlling for endogenousnmobility we study firm-size wage differentials in Switzerland. We find that the observed crosssectionalnfirm size premium cannot be explained exclusively by worker heterogeneity. Almost 50n% of the cross-section differential is a firm-size effect. |
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Bruno Frey, Marcel Kucher, History as Reflected in Capital Markets: The Case of World War II, In: Working paper series / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, No. No. 2, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
"Historical events are reflected in asset prices. Looking at government bond prices of five European countries traded on the Swiss stock exchange during WWII provides a useful way of interpreting the importance attributed to various war events. We direct our attention to value changes in government bonds of five different nations: On the side of the Axis, Germany and Austria; on the side of the Allies, France; and the two neutral countries Belgium and Switzerland. The econometric analysis reveals that some events that are generally considered crucial are clearly reflected in government bond prices of the countries considered. This holds, in particular, for the official outbreak of the war in July to September 1939 (which sent down the government bond values not only of Austria, Belgium and France but also of Germany) and for losses and gains of national sovereignty." |
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Massimo Filippini, Economies Of Scale In The Swiss Nursing Home Industry, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 9901, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
This paper examines costs in the Swiss nursing home industry, an issue of concern to Swiss policy makers because of the explosion of elderly care costs and the aging of the population. The paper considers estimation of a translog cost function employing panel data for a sample of 36 nonprofit nursing homes operating in Ticino, a canton of Switzerland, over the period 1993-1995. Using a set of dummy variables quality differences are considered. The results of this analysis indicate the existence of economies of scale for most output levels. |
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Hans Gersbach, Armin Schmutzler, Endogenous Spillovers and Incentives to Innovate, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 9902, 1999. (Working Paper)
 
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Michael Breuer, Pareto-Verbesserungen in der Sozialversicherung durch Selbstselektion ihrer Mitglieder, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 9804, 1998. (Working Paper)
 
In der Sozialversicherung gelten Risikoselektionen als unerwuenscht, weil sie die Gefahr mit sich bringen, dass der einheitliche Risikopool in der Sozialversicherung aufgespalten und die sozialpolitisch gewuenschten Umverteilungsstroeme zwischen den Versicherten reduziert werden. Der Beitrag zeigt am Beispiel der sozialen Krankenversicherung in der Schweiz und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf, dass die Selbstselektion von Versicherten in der Sozialversicherung produktiv, das heisst wohlfahrtssteigernd eingesetzt werden kann, ohne den ‚solidarischen‘ Charakter der Sozialversicherung in Frage zu stellen. Konkret wird vorgeschlagen, den Versicherten innerhalb eines durch einen Risikoausgleich gestuetzten Wettbewerbs zwischen den Krankenkassen eine groessere Wahlfreiheit ueber die Hoehe des Versicherungsschutzes einzuraeumen. Fuer Versicherte mit niedrigem Risiko oder hohem Einkommen kann es sinnvoll sein, ihren Versicherungsschutz innerhalb der Sozialversicherung zu reduzieren, obwohl sie dann aufgrund des konstanten Transfers an andere Versicherte der sozialen Krankenversicherung einen hoeheren Preis pro Einheit Sozialversicherungsschutz zu zahlen haben. |
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Armin Schmutzler, Environmental Regulations and Managerial Myopia, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 9903, 1998. (Working Paper)
 
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Massimo Filippini, Jörg Wild, The Estimation of an Average Cost Frontier to Calculate Benchmark Tariffs for Electricity Distribution, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 9803, 1998. (Working Paper)
 
In this paper we have examined the scale and cost inefficiency of a sample of Swiss electricity distribution utilities. To do so, we have considered estimation of a stochastic frontier average cost model using the approach suggested by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) for panel data. A translog cost function was estimated using panel data for a sample of 30 municipal utilities over the period 1992-1996. The results indicate the existence of economies of output and customer density and economies of scale. Moreover, the findings on cost inefficiency show that a majority of the distribution utilities is not producing at the minimum level of the cost and that a possible application of the frontier methodology employed in this paper relates to the regulation and benchmarking of the delivery rates. |
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Christoph Zaborowski, Peter Zweifel, Getting Out of Debt: Attachment of wage in whose interest?, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 9802, 1998. (Working Paper)
 
Attachment of wage as a way for creditors to enforce payment by unwilling or insolvent debtors is not very successful in several countries. Based on a dynamic model of debtor behaviour, this paper explores two alternatives of reform. One is to reduce the rate of attachment, which at present amounts to 100 percent of the wage income exceeding the subsistence level, thus probably destroying incentives to work. According to model simulations, reducing the attachment rate is likely to result in an increase of labour supply but a decrease of attachment revenue per period. Second, the introduction of a debt release would have an ambiguous effect on labour supply. While resulting in a partial loss for creditors, it would permit debtors to get out of debt. A Pareto improvement thus does not seem to be possible. When taking the taxpayers as an involved third party into account, however, a potential Pareto improvement appears attainable. |
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Susanne Bonomo, Massimo Filippini, Peter Zweifel, Neue Aufschlüsse über die Elektrizitätsnachfrage der schweizerischen Haushalte, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 9801, 1998. (Working Paper)
 
Die vorliegende Untersuchung wurde ermöglicht durch das vom Bundesamt für Energiewirtschaft finanzierte Projekt „Auswirkungen einer grenzkostenorientierten Tarifrevision auf die Elektrizitätsnachfrage“. Wir danken dem Bundesamt für Energiewirtschaft, dem Bundesamt für Statistik sowie den Elektrizitätswerken der Städte Zürich, Bern und Basel für die tatkräftige Unterstützung des Projekts. |
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Massimo Filippini, Jörg Wild, Ein Pool-Modell für die schweizerische Elektrizitätswirtschaft, In: Working paper series / Socioeconomic Institute, No. No. 9701, 1997. (Working Paper)
 
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