Contributions in Merlin

null

Recent developments on international financial markets have called the benefits of bank globalization into question. Large, internationally active banks have acquired substantial market power, and international activities have not necessarily made banks less risky. Yet, surprisingly little is known about the actual link between bank internationalization, bank risk, and market power. Analyzing this link is the purpose of this paper. We jointly estimate the determinants of risk and market power of banks, and we analyze the effects of changes in terms of the number of foreign countries (the extensive margin) and the volume of foreign assets (the intensive margin). Our paper has four main findings. First, there is a strong negative feedback effect between risk and market power. Second, banks with higher shares of foreign assets, in particular those held through foreign branches, have higher market power at home. Third, holding assets in a large number of foreign countries tends to increase bank risk. Fourth, the impact of internationalization differs across banks from different banking groups and of different size.

Class specific mortality in 17th and 18th Century Vienna shows a cyclical pattern which is related to grain price cycles in the 5-10 years range. This relationship is not stable over time. Applying spectral analysis based on time-varying VARs, it can be shown that at the beginning of the observation period, comovement of grain prices and mortality is considerably high in areas populated by lower classes of society. This comovement cannot be found in richer areas of the city and vanishes over time for the entire population of the city.

This paper explores the labor supply effects of a large-scale policy change in the Austrian disability insurance program, which tightened eligibility criteria for men above a certain age. Using administrative data on the universe of Austrian private-sector employees, the results of difference-in-difference type regressions suggest a substantial and statistically significant decline in disability enrollment of 5-5.7 percentage points and a modest increase in employment of 1.4 to 2.7 percentage points. On the other hand, the policy change had important spillover effects into the unemployment and sickness insurance program. Specifically, the share of individuals receiving unemployment benefits increased roughly by 3 percentage points and the share receiving sickness insurance benefits by 0.6 percentage points.

This paper analyzes awards as a means of motivation prevalent in the scientific community, but so far neglected in the economic literature on incentives, and discusses their relationship to monetary compensation. Awards are better suited than performance pay to reward scientific tasks, which are typically of a vague nature. They derive their value, for instance, from signaling research talent to outsiders. Awards should therefore be taken seriously as a means of motivating research that may complement, or even substitute for, monetary incentives. While we discuss awards in the context of academia, our conclusions apply to other principal-agent settings as well.

One of the most basic questions in economics concerns the effects of competition onnmarket prices. We show that the neglect of both fairness concerns and decision errors prevents ansatisfactory understanding of how competition affects prices. We conducted experiments whichndemonstrate that the introduction of even a very small amount of competition to a bilateralnexchange situation - by adding just one competitor - induces large behavioral changes amongnbuyers and sellers, causing large changes in market prices. Models that assume that all people arenself-interested and fully rational fail to explain these changes satisfactorily. In contrast, a modelnthat combines heterogeneous fairness concerns with decision errors predicts all comparative staticneffects of changes in competition correctly. Moreover, the combined model enables us to predictnthe entire distribution of prices in many different competitive situations remarkably well.

In this paper we explore a serious eating disorder, bulimia nervosa (BN), which a­fflicts a surprising number of girls in the US. We challenge the long-held belief that BN primarily affects high income White teenagers, using a unique data set on adolescent females evaluated regarding their tendencies towards bulimic behaviors independent of any diagnoses or treatment they have received. Our results reveal that African Americans are more likely to exhibit bulimic behavior than Whites; as are girls from low income families compared to middle and high income families. We use another data set to show that who is diagnosed with an eating disorder is in accord with popular beliefs, suggesting that African American and low-income girls are being under-diagnosed for BN. Our findings have important implications for public policy since they provide direction to policy makers regarding which adolescent females are most at risk for BN. Our results are robust to different model specifications and identifying assumptions.

Using the Swiss Graduate Survey, we study how the type of tertiary education an individual chooses (i.e., vocational or academic) influences career entry and labor market success after graduation. Our results show that vocational graduates face less risky career entry than academic graduates. Considering endogenous educational choice by using parental education as an instrument, we find higher returns for vocational tertiary education. In the longer term, initial educational type effects disappear, so vocational and academic graduates face the same risk and return. Therefore, career entry for vocational graduates compares favorably to that of academic graduates, while career success for both educational types equalizes over time.

This chapter analyzes how one particular governance mechanism affects the performance of research teams. We look at an external requirement for interdisciplinarity and internationality of Research Training Groups (RTGs) and study how their performance is affected. We expect to observe two countervailing effects with changes in interdisciplinarity and/or internatio-nality: first, increased performance due to an increase in productive resources and a second, decreased performance due to increased team problems (communication, conflicts etc). Since both effects are expected to vary with the disciplinary field of research, we separate our analysis for the Humanities & Social Sciences in comparison to the Natural & Life Sciences and indeed find different effects in the different disciplinary fields. Furthermore, we separately analyze the effects of interdisciplinarity on the one hand and internationality on the other hand. We conclude that the effectiveness of a particular governance mechanism varies substantially between the disciplinary fields and for the type of heterogeneity under consideration. Therefore governance of research should be either precisely engineered to a particular disciplinary field and a given type of heterogeneity or it should offer a menu of options that allows research teams to choose from according to their specific needs.